Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

108 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
“Berthing Plan” or Harbor Bomb Plot Messages
Th e shift in ONI leadership took place on October 10, the
day after the “berthing plan” message—asking the Japanese consul
in Hawaii to report the movements of U.S. naval ships in
and out of Pearl Harbor—became available in Washington. Rear
Admiral Th eodore S. Wilkinson, who had been serving as commanding
offi cer aboard the battleship USS Mississippi took over
as chief of ONI on October 15. Prior to joining the ONI, he had
had no experience with naval intelligence “other than attendance
at two international conferences for limitation of armaments in
1933 and 1934.” 69
Th e Pearl Harbor commanders were never advised of the
“berthing plan” message. Th e failure to notify them of its existence
and of the other “ships-in-harbor” messages decoded
later in Washington, could have been due to failure on the part
of those evaluating intelligence to recognize the importance of
these messages. It could have been due to disarray accompanying
the turnover in ONI personnel. It could have been due to mere
negligence. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that neither
War Plans nor ONI notifi ed the Pearl Harbor commanders of
those critical messages.
Th e U.S. Navy’s communications personnel in Hawaii were
under instructions to try to solve the Japanese navy code ( JN-
25). Th ey were not to spend time trying to decipher Japanese
intercepts in the Japanese consular code ( J-19) or any other
code; these were to be mailed to Washington for decoding and
translating. Th erefore, our people in Hawaii made no attempt
to decode and translate these intercepts, but simply forwarded
them, as instructed, to Washington. Airmail from Hawaii to
Washington then was not nonstop. It was by short hops and only
69 Ibid., part 4, p. 1724.