Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

106 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows
in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least
until something indicates the trend. 66
Japanese Stocks of Strategic
Materials Dangerously Low
Estimates of Japan’s stocks of strategic materials furnished
clues to the Japanese situation. Lieutenant Albert E.
Hindmarsh, an economic analyst in the far eastern section of
Naval Intelligence, had access to all available intelligence, including
MAGIC. Hindmarsh was also regularly reading the minutes
of the Japanese parliament. By following its debates, he could
determine how much the Japanese government was paying per
unit for storage of some 23 strategic materials. He then divided
these fi gures into the total amounts shown in the Japanese budget
for this purpose. In that way, he was able to calculate the stocks of
Japan’s strategic materials still on hand.
At regular intervals Hindmarsh personally took to Roosevelt
his estimates of the stocks of these various materials. Japan’s
severest shortage was of oil. Our oil embargo, especially the
embargo on aviation gasoline, was putting Japan in a desperate
plight. Hindmarsh calculated in mid-summer 1941, that she had
on hand about 75 million barrels. In a war Hindmarsh fi gured
she would need 52 million barrels per year. She had enough mica,
which came from India, for four years. And her stocks of hemp
and sisal were suffi cient, so she could safely bypass the Philippines.
Hindmarsh was able to explain to FDR that, in view of Japan’s
economic priorities, she would have to aim fi rst at replenishing
her oil stocks; he expected her primary objective would be the
66 Ibid., part 16, pp. 2214–15 (Stark to Kimmel, October 17,1941).