Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 105
forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might the situation
could only grow more tense.” Stark wrote that Hull kept him
pretty well informed and added in a P.S. dated September 29, “if
there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you
know.” 64 Once more Kimmel felt reassured that he would be sent
any information pertinent to Pearl Harbor.
On October 2, Roosevelt and Hull, after several exchanges
of notes, again turned down Konoye’s proposal for a Hawaii
meeting.
Two weeks later, on October 6, Konoye, who had been doing
his best to maintain peaceful relations between his country and
the United States, was forced to resign. Konoye’s successor was
an army general, Hideki Tojo. With a government composed primarily
of military men, Japan’s “War Party” was in control. Th e
chances of solving Japan’s economic needs by peaceful means
faded.
Stark analyzed the Japanese power shift in a cable to his three
fl eet commanders.
Th e resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave
situation X. . . . Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible
by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility
that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of
these possibilities you will take due precautions including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention
nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X 65
In a covering letter to Kimmel, Stark wrote:
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and
the message I sent you merely stated the “possibility”; in fact
I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps
64 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 16, pp. 2212–14. Stark letter to
Kimmel, September 23, 1941; postscript dated September 29.
65 Ibid., part 14, p. 1327.