Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

104 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
on August 30, he wrote that he wanted the department, working
in cooperation with the Navy Department, to submit to him by
September 10, 1941, their
recommendation of distribution of expected United States
production of munitions of war as between the United States,
Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aided—by
important items, quantity, time schedules, and approximate values
for the period from the present time until June 30 [1942].
FDR also wanted to receive their
general conclusions as to the over-all production eff ort of
important items needed for victory on the general assumption
that the reservoir of munitions power available to the United
States and her friends is suffi ciently superior to that available
to the Axis Powers to insure defeat of the latter. 62
Wedemeyer completed his exhaustive study by FDR’s
deadline. 63
Japan’s Peace Party Falls;
Her War Party Takes Over
With our embargo in full eff ect, Japan’s economic plight was
fast deteriorating. In a desperate eff ort to save his government,
Prime Minister Konoye on August 28 renewed his plea for a personal
meeting with Roosevelt in Hawaii. Th e administration did
not reply immediately.
By September 23 the conversations with the Japanese ambassador
in Washington had “practically reached an impasse.” Stark
had a confi dential talk with Hull about the situation and then
reported to Kimmel: “Conversations without results cannot last
62 Ibid., p. 348.
63 Ibid., p. 351.