Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 103
Again, on August 12, Kimmel reminded Stark of the fl eet’s
needs. Kimmel believed the radar equipment was
far behind what it should be. . . . We need more ships of all
types for a successful Pacifi c campaign but I believe we need
submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even more than we
need battleships. Th is is a vast ocean. 59
Stark sympathized with Kimmel’s supply problem but was
unable to help. He responded on August 22 to several of Kimmel’s
more recent requests for men and materiel: “I know you want
results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading
to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture
presented is not too unsatisfactory.” 60 Although Kimmel got
some results over the months he was in command, he generally
got more excuses than results.
The Victory Program Completed
In estimating the military and production requirements of
the nation, Wedemeyer had to seek data from many sources. He
looked into the status of the shipping, munitions requirements,
and munitions production of U.S. troop bases. He explored the
situation and capabilities of each of the major combatant nations,
the capabilities and probable lines of action of both friendly
and Axis powers. It was assumed that “the earliest date when
U.S. armed forces could be mobilized, trained, and equipped for
extensive operations” would be July 1, 1943. 61
Th e president’s July 9 request had enlarged the scope of
Wedemeyer’s survey. A couple of months later, Roosevelt expanded
the task still further. In a memorandum to the War Department
59 Ibid., part 16, pp. 2243–45.
60 Ibid., p. 2181. Stark to Kimmel, August 22, 1941.
61 Watson, Th e War Department, pp. 348–55.