Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 101
and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding
the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and
American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security
of the United States. 54
Th e next day in a wire signed by Roosevelt, transmitted by the
State Department to the U.S. embassy in London, it was reported
that FDR and Hull had received the Japanese ambassador and
had
made to him a statement covering the position of this
Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further
steps in the direction of military domination by force along the
lines of the proposed statement such as you [Churchill] and I
[FDR] had discussed. Th e statement I made to him was no less
vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we
had discussed. 55
Th is statement was later referred to by Stimson and others as
the “fi rst ultimatum” to Japan.
Kimmel Continues to Request Men and
Equipment for the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii
Before Kimmel took over as commander-in-chief of the
Pacifi c Fleet at Pearl Harbor on February 1, 1941, he had had an
opportunity “to survey the situation” briefl y. He had written Stark
on January 27 that he was
particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for
the task of defending this base. . . . I think the supply of an
54 Ibid., p. 714. FDR’s oral statement to Nomura, August 17, 1941.
55 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1941. vol. 4: Th e Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1956), p. 380.