Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

100 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
heads of the two Governments to meet, say in Honolulu.” 52 On
August 17, the United States rejected this proposal. Hull
made it clear that he did not see how conversations between
the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals
be discussed while Japanese offi cial spokesmen and the
Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring
to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the
United States. 53
The First U. S. “Ultimatum” to Japan
Th e public announcement of the Argentia meeting of
Roosevelt and Churchill announced the Atlantic Charter, but
said nothing about the tough words FDR had agreed to address
to Japan as a result of his conversations with Churchill. It had
been “mutually understood” by the men “that the Governments
of both the United States and Great Britain needed more time
to prepare for resistance against possible Japanese attack in the
Far East.” Th erefore, it had been agreed that Roosevelt should
make clear to Japan in no uncertain terms that further aggression
against her neighboring countries would not be tolerated,
that such aggression would force those countries to take measures
to safeguard their rights. Accordingly, once FDR was back
in Washington, he informed the Japanese ambassador (August
17) that
if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance
of a policy or program of military domination by force or
threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of
the United States will be compelled to take immediately any
52 Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1943), p. 708.
53 Ibid., p. 715.