Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 99
them was a message dated July 31 from the Japanese foreign minister
in Tokyo to Japan’s ambassador in Berlin concerning their
desperate economic situation. 50 A copy was sent to Nomura, the
Japanese ambassador in Washington. It read in part:
Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third
countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually
becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it
much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life,
must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South
Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder
this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is
being woven under the guidance and with the participation of
England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon
seemingly asleep. Th at is why we decided to obtain military
bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy
that territory . . . and now Japanese-American relations are
more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. 51
After being decoded and translated, this message was distributed
to Roosevelt and his advisers, the few top offi cials in
Washington who were privy to MAGIC. Th is cable further confi
rmed Japan’s economic plight and the impending crisis due to
the U.S. sanctions.
On August 6 Japan again off ered to negotiate.
Japanese Prime Minister Fuminaro Konoye, who represented
Japan’s “Peace Party,” suggested a personal meeting with Roosevelt,
“with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment [in U.S.-
Japan relations] could be brought about.” On August 8 Nomura
asked Hull “whether it might not be possible for the responsible
50Ibid., part 12, p. 8.
51Ibid., p. 9.