Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

98 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Chief of Naval Operations Stark, FDR by executive order froze
all Japanese assets in this country. England followed suit the following
day. 46
Th is brought all trade between the United States and Japan to
an end. Japan had warned that this drastic measure would leave
her in desperate straits. It hurt especially because it deprived her
of regular gasoline from which she had been able to produce
higher grade aviation gas. 47 Back in November 1940 Roosevelt
had been well aware of the crisis that would arise if Japan were
deprived of oil.
Ambassador Grew and Stark understood Japan’s economic
plight and realized she might go to war if her oil were shut off .
Stark had argued that “unless we were prepared for war—I do
not mean prepared in the sense of complete readiness for war,
but unless we were ready to accept a war risk, we should not take
measures which would cut oil down to the Japanese below that
needed for what might be called their normal peace time needs
for their industry and their ships.” He said he “never waivered
[sic] one inch on that stand.” 48 Nevertheless, the United States
went ahead and imposed sanctions. Th e die was cast.
Stark cabled his three fl eet commanders on July 25 about the
economic sanctions. It was expected that these sanctions would
include all trade except for a few items for which export licenses
would be issued. He advised the commanders to “take appropriate
precautionary measures against possible eventualities.” 49
All this time, we were still intercepting, decoding, and reading
Japanese messages sent in the diplomatic code, “Purple.” Among
46Ibid., p. 290.
47 Interview ( January 9, 1964) of Japanese expert, Captain Albert E. Hindmarsh
(typescript in author’s fi les).
48Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, p. 43. Stark testimony before
the Navy Court of Inquiry.
49Ibid., part 24, p.1355. Stark testimony before the Roberts Commission,
Exhibit 13.