Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 97
Th e assignment Marshall had given Wedemeyer in May, to
determine the needs of the Army, was to be expanded to include
the Navy and Air Corps also. From this “a real Victory Program”
was to be developed encompassing, by presidential directive
(August 30, 1941), the distribution of munitions as well, not
only to U.S. forces, but also to those of Great Britain, Russia,
and other countries needing our help. 43 Th e War Plans Division’s
draft, which Wedemeyer had completed by July 1, became the
basis of the more extensive project, and Wedemeyer was assigned
“the major responsibility for the new and larger task.” 44
In view of the fact that the United States was still offi cially
neutral, security concerning this ultra-secret Victory Program
“for the winning of a war not yet declared” was extremely tight.
Only fi ve copies were prepared, each numbered and registered.
Wedemeyer kept his working copy; he gave one to Stimson for
presentation to FDR, and three to his superiors. It was thought
that this very limited distribution would prevent any leak.
U.S.-Japan Relations “Treading the Evil Road”
As we have seen, the Japanese had received the permission
of the Vichy government of unoccupied France to land
troops in French Indochina and to acquire there the rice and
other raw materials she desperately needed. 45 Both the United
States and Britain objected to these arrangements. On July 23,
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles broke off the talks then
going on with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. Th e
next day the United States denounced Japan’s actions in French
Indochina. Th en on July 25, in retaliation for Japan’s Indochina
moves and against the advice of Ambassador Grew in Japan and
43Ibid., pp. 347–49.
44Ibid., p. 342.
45U.S. Congress, Events, p. 289.