Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

96 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were lukewarm, if not
cool, to these proposals. Th ey balked at the Japanese plan for
“Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities.” 39
On June 21, Hull, “handed the Japanese Ambassador a complete
rewrite of the draft proposal.” 40 Th e talks with the Japanese were
stalled.
Hitler’s Invasion of Russia Alters Situation
and Expands Call for Worldwide Coordination
During the night of June 21–22 Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R.
Th e Soviets immediately became an enemy of Germany, and
Britain immediately became an ally of the Soviets. Once we
learned of Germany’s invasion of Russia and of Britain’s alliance
with the Soviet Union against Germany, U.S. policy shifted. We
released Russian credits, refused to apply the neutrality law to the
Soviet Union, and promised American aid to Stalin’s regime. 41
Roosevelt called for an additional eff ort to coordinate war
planning and production. On July 9 he sent an urgent message to
his secretaries of war and navy asking them to
join . . . in exploring at once the overall production requirements
required to defeat our potential enemies . . . [and] the
munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in
your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate
amount that available to our potential enemies. 42
39 Ibid., pp. 444, 447.
40 Ibid., p. 483. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp.
1400–01. (7/24/41, re sanctions on Japan).
41 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aff airs. Events Leading up to World War
II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to
and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence,
1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, pp. 286–87.
42 Watson, Th e War Department, pp. 338–39.