Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

94 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Coordination of U.S. War Plans and
Production
By this time, demands for war materiel were being submitted
to the United States from all over the world. Requests for
supplies and equipment were coming in from the British, beleaguered
in the Atlantic and in Singapore; from the Chinese under
pressure by the Japanese; and from our own forces in the fi eld.
Eff ective coordination was needed. On May 21, Marshall, under
pressure from the War Department, the Offi ce of Production
Management, and especially the White House, sought a “complete
statement of Army needs—not for 1941 and 1942 but for
the actual winning of a war not yet declared.” He asked the various
divisions of the War Department general staff to make strategic
estimates of our ground, air, and naval situations, and to list
items of equipment needed “as an aid to industry in its planning.”
Th e War Plans Division assigned Major (later Lt. Gen.) A.C.
Wedemeyer the immense task of researching and assembling
from widely scattered sources the necessary data on military
requirements, supplies, reserves, and production. 35
United States–Japan Diplomatic
Conversations: in Washington
Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura, had begun negotiations with the United States. Japan
was willing to make quite a few concessions from her point of
view, and for a while in June 1941, it looked as though an amicable
conclusion might be reached. Th e major bone of contention
was the presence of Japanese troops in China. In the course of the
discussions, Japan agreed to withdraw most of her troops from
35 Mark Skinner Watson, Th e War Department: Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division,
1950), pp. 336–37.