Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

92 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e ADB report also outlined cooperative procedures to
be followed by the land, sea, and air forces of the several parties
in the event of hostilities. Th e United States turned down
a British request at the meeting that it send the Pacifi c Fleet to
Singapore.
Roosevelt knew these agreements were not constitutional.
Yet he sanctioned and continued pressing secretly for still closer
ties with Britain and her allies. According to Robert Sherwood,
one of FDR’s speechwriters and close advisers, “Roosevelt never
overlooked the fact that his actions might lead to his immediate
or eventual impeachment.” 30 From the administration’s point of
view, therefore, it was imperative that “the very existence of any
American-British joint plans, however tentative, had to be kept
utterly secret.” Sherwood called it “ironic” that
in all probability, no great damage would have been done had
the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans
and the Japanese; whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the
Congress and the press, American preparation for war might
have been well nigh wrecked and ruined. 31
U.S. Ships Transferred from
Pacific to Atlantic Fleet
In April 1941 Kimmel learned not only that he would not
be receiving the ships he had requested to strengthen his fl eet,
30 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 274.
31 Ibid., pp. 273–74. Here Sherwood quotes noted historian, Charles A.
Beard:
If these precedents are to stand unimpeached and to provide sanctions
for the continued conduct of American foreign aff airs, the Constitution
may be nullifi ed by the President, offi cials, and offi cers who have taken
the oath, and are under moral obligation to uphold it.