Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 91
Th e 33-page ADB report that issued from this Singapore
conference was classifi ed MOST SECRET. It described specifi c
moves on the part of Japan that would force the signers of the
agreement to recommend that their governments take military
action against Japan.
It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would
create a position in which our failure to take active military
counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage,
should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise
our respective Governments to authorise such action:
(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the
Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated
Powers. . . .
(b) Th e movement of the Japanese forces into any part of
Th ailand to the West of 100° East or to the South of 10°
North.
(c) Th e movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or
of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships,
which from its position and course was clearly directed upon
the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra [the
narrow strip of land connecting Singapore’s peninsula with the
Asian mainland] or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed
the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines,
a line from the Gulf of Davao [on the southeastern-most tip
of the Philippines] to Waigeo Island [the northwestern-most
island of New Guinea], or the Equator East of Waigeo.
(d) Th e movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.
(e) Th e movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or
the Loyalty Islands [northeast of New Caledonia]. 29
29 Ibid., p. 1564.