Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

88 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e question of sending a detachment of the fl eet to the Far
East had been brought up several times. Stark and Kimmel both
considered it “unwise.” However, Stark wrote,
even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up
in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my
view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not.
Th e attitude of the people in the country with respect to the
war was confused, Stark wrote. “I simply can not predict the outcome.”
His memo to FDR represented, he said, his “best estimate
of the Far Eastern present situation.”
Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor
Requests “Intelligence”
In addition to equipment and supplies, a commander in the
fi eld also needs intelligence; that is, information, particularly
information relevant for military planning and preparations. Th e
Navy Department in Washington inevitably receives such secret
or confi dential information, which the commanders in the fi eld
are entitled to have, and should have, if they are to carry out their
duties. After Kimmel took over command of the fl eet at Pearl
Harbor, he requested not only ships, men, equipment, supplies,
and munitions, but also intelligence; he asked Stark to furnish him
with whatever “information of a secret nature” was available. 24
Stark replied that this was the responsibility of the Offi ce of
Naval Intelligence (ONI). “ONI is fully aware of its responsibility
in keeping you adequately informed.” 25
In 1941, information concerning the location of Japanese
merchant vessels was forwarded weekly from Washington by airmail
to Pearl Harbor. Th us Kimmel was receiving material on a
24 Ibid., part 16, p. 2229. Kimmel to Stark (February 18, 1941).
25 Ibid., part 17, p. 2160. Stark to Kimmel (March 22, 1941).