Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

86 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
strategic error at this time to divide our Pacifi c Fleet . . . in three
parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacifi c, and Western Pacifi c.”
“If we are forced into the war,” Stark continued, “our main
eff ort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against
Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war
in the Far East.” Th e Pacifi c Fleet should remain strong until we
see what Japan is going to do. Th en, if she moved toward Malaysia
in southeast Asia, we would be in a position to
vigorously attack the Mandates [an archipelago of south
Pacifi c islands mandated after World War I to Japan to administer]
and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan’s
attack on the British and Dutch.
At the same time, we could continue to lend support to the battle
in the Atlantic.
Stark recommended against doing anything in the Far East
which would reveal our intentions. We should not send “any considerable
division . . . to Manila [as that] might prove an invitation
to Japan to attack us.” We “should not indicate the slightest
interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands [lest the
Japanese] smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as
surprise is concerned, might be compromised.” Th e Japanese are
trained for amphibious operations—we are not—and they would
then be able to occupy some of those British-held islands before
we could.
To reinforce this position against doing anything that might
appear to threaten Japan unless we were ready to fi ght, Stark
quoted from a telegram just received from the U.S. embassy in
Tokyo:
Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration
of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible
to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such