Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 85
Admiral Stark Opposes Antagonizing Japan
Roosevelt had been doing his best for months to give the
British aid and comfort, although he had been restrained, primarily
by public opinion, from openly involving the United States in
the war against Germany. Stark shared the president’s desire to
enter that war, but he did not always go along with Roosevelt’s
risky moves in the Pacifi c.
Stark’s friendship with FDR was such that he could express
himself candidly—and he often did. On February 11, 1941,
Stark wrote FDR a long memorandum, cautioning against the
tactics he was adopting in the Pacifi c. 20 Th e question of sending
a detachment of cruisers on a tour of the Philippines had been
discussed at a meeting of top administration offi cials. FDR had
questioned the desirability of such a maneuver, called it a “bluff ,”
and said he “did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6 [cruisers]
. . . in the Philippines in case of sudden attack.” Stark had
then “breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty
defi nitely closed.” 21
Stark opposed such a move and he explained his reasons: 22
“Sending a small force [of ships to Manila] would probably be no
deterrent to Japan,” Stark wrote, and it would not hinder Japan’s
southward advance. Further moves against Japan could “precipitate
hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan
no excuse for coming in, in case we are forced into hostilities with
Germany whom we all consider our major problem.”
Although the Pacifi c Fleet was “weaker in total tonnage and
aircraft than the Japanese Navy,” he considered it “a very strong
force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant
serious and real threat to Japan’s fl ank.” It would be “a grave
20Ibid., part 16, pp. 2150–51; part 33, pp. 1203–04.
21Ibid., part 16, p. 2150; part 33, p. 1203.
22Ibid., part 16, pp. 2150–51; part 33, pp. 1203–04.