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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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U.S. Military Plans <strong>and</strong> Preparations 83<br />

Admiral Kimmel, New Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-<br />

Chief, U.S. Fleet, Strives to Build up<br />

Fleet’s Strength in <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong><br />

Kimmel realized that, for strategic reasons, the Fleet did not<br />

belong at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>. He considered Richardson’s arguments<br />

against holding the fl eet there valid. Yet Kimmel realized he<br />

could not oppose the president on this issue <strong>and</strong> expect to retain<br />

his comm<strong>and</strong>. Th e best he could do was to try to get the materiel<br />

needed to defend the fl eet. Over the next year, in letter after letter<br />

to CNO Stark, he asked for personnel, weapons, radar, destroyers,<br />

cruisers, planes, ammunition. 14<br />

CNO Admiral Stark gained a reputation for persistence as<br />

he continued to appeal to Roosevelt for men <strong>and</strong> materiel. He<br />

once asked FDR for 300,000 men for the Navy. Th ere were a lot<br />

<strong>of</strong> people in the room at the time. FDR, always jovial when he<br />

had an audience, simply “threw back his head <strong>and</strong> laughed.” He<br />

then turned to the others in the room <strong>and</strong> said, “Betty,” referring<br />

to Stark by his nickname, “usually begins working early; he starts<br />

in working a year ahead <strong>of</strong> time <strong>and</strong> he follows it up.” 15<br />

To strengthen its defenses, the Navy recommended construction<br />

<strong>of</strong> a battleship <strong>and</strong> cruiser dry dock at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>. 16<br />

However, all the funds then available for construction had been<br />

allocated. Admiral Ben Moreell, chief <strong>of</strong> the Navy’s bureau <strong>of</strong><br />

yards <strong>and</strong> docks, which would be building the dry dock, felt he<br />

should not go ahead without written authorization. He suggested<br />

that Stark ask FDR, in light <strong>of</strong> the “limited National emergency”<br />

then in eff ect, to authorize the funds in writing. Without being<br />

specifi c as to who had made the request, Stark approached FDR.<br />

When he reported back to Moreell, Stark said he had “never seen<br />

14 Ibid., part 16, pp. 2225–57.<br />

15 Ibid., part 5, p 2273. Stark testimony.<br />

16 Julius Augustus Furer, Administration <strong>of</strong> the Navy Department in World War II<br />

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1959), p. 404.

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