Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

82 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
consideration for us. [Italics in original]. . . . [O]ur fi rst concern
is to protect the Fleet.” Marshall told Short of “the pressures on
the Department [from other sources] for the limited materiel
we have.” However, he believed the existing defenses in Hawaii
would discourage an enemy’s attack “if no serious harm is done
us during the fi rst six hours of known hostilities.”
Marshall speculated on the most likely threat to Hawaii:
Th e risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by
Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.
Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian
Islands so long as we have air superiority.
However, Marshall reminded Short:
Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our
mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and
that purpose should be clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. 12
Marshall wrote Short again on March 5, requesting an “early
review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard
to defense from air attack.” And he added, “Th e establishment of
a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this
end is a matter of fi rst priority.” 13 Marshall recognized that, as
chief of staff , he was responsible for protecting Hawaii, and he
was again calling the attention of his Hawaiian commander to
that responsibility.
12 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 32, pp. 565–66. Marshall’s
February 7, 1941, letter to Short.
13 Ibid., part 15, p. 1605.