Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 81
On his return to Washington, Richardson was directed to
report to Secretary of the Navy Knox. When he called on Knox
on March 24, he asked why he had been removed as CINCUS
so peremptorily, after having served only 13 months of the usual
24-month tour of duty. “Why, Richardson,” Knox responded,
“when you were here in Washington last October, you hurt the
President’s feelings by what you said to him. You should realize
that.” 11
Richardson’s relief put on notice all top-ranked offi cers, including
his replacement, that Roosevelt would brook no opposition to
his plans. It was a warning to all military offi cers that criticism
of FDR, their commander-in-chief under the Constitution, was
not tolerated.
General Marshall’s Responsibility
for the Fleet
Marshall appointed Lieutenant General Walter C. Short
to be commanding general of the Hawaiian department, eff ective
February 7, 1941. Th at same day, Marshall wrote Short that
Kimmel, who had taken over command of the fl eet in Pearl
Harbor the week before, had written his superior, CNO Stark,
about the serious shortages of army materiel needed for the protection
of Pearl Harbor. Kimmel had “referred specifi cally to
planes and antiaircraft guns.” Marshall wrote Short that Kimmel
didn’t realize that the army was “tragically lacking in this materiel
. . . and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command
in the Army.”
Marshall’s letter revealed concern for more than just the
Hawaiian situation. Nevertheless, Marshall advised Short that
the protection of the fl eet was the Army’s major responsibility.
“Th e fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major
11 Ibid., p. 424.