Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 79 missed this opportunity to become a general. Pershing continued to press Marshall’s case, but to no avail. Marshall was relegated to the position of senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard (1933–1938). 7 Th rough Marshall’s diligence in working with the CCC, he made a number of friends in the Roosevelt administration. He came to know several persons of infl uence, notably Judge Advocate Scott Lucas, later a U.S. senator who was to serve on the 1945- 1946 Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack; Major General Frank McCoy, Stimson’s longtime aide; and Harry Hopkins, FDR’s close adviser. Pershing also continued to support Marshall. Such friends stood him in good stead as the years went by. In July 1938 Marshall was brought to Washington as director of war plans. From then on, with the help of Hopkins and others, Marshall advanced rapidly. He was promoted to brigadier general, eff ective October 1, 1938. On October 15, after only three months in war plans, he was appointed deputy chief of staff . On April 27, 1939, it was announced that Marshall would be advanced over many offi cers with more seniority to become the Army’s new chief of staff . He took over offi cially on September 1, 1939, the very day Hitler’s forces marched into Poland, becoming in the process a temporary four-star general—from one to four stars in less than a year! As chief of staff , Marshall was “the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment.” He was also “charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program.” 8 Th e chief of staff ’s obligation was to report directly to 7Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 1830–1939, (New York: Viking Adult, 1963), pp. 290–99. 8Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, p. 1050. Quoted from Army regulations.

80 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall proved himself to be a loyal and devoted deputy to his superior, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Th e chief of staff ’s responsibility in peacetime—and the United States was still at peace when Marshall took over—was to serve “by direction of the president,” as “Commanding General of the Field Forces.” In that capacity he was to direct “fi eld operations and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea forces, and of the GHQ units.” If war were to break out, he was to continue exercising command of the fi eld forces “until such time as the President shall have specifi cally designated a Commanding General thereof.” 9 Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the Navy when the fl eet was in port. More about that later. Th e chief of staff and the president were the only ones with legal authority to issue command orders to the army commanders in the fi eld. Th e secretary of war, a civilian, was outside this line of command. Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Fleet, Relieved of Command In January 1941 Richardson, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), was notifi ed that he was being relieved of his command in about three weeks. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was named to replace him, eff ective February 1. Richardson was “deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet,” as he wrote later, “there was some feeling of prospective relief, for I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, and I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt.” 10 9 Ibid. 10 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 420.

80 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall<br />

proved himself to be a loyal <strong>and</strong> devoted deputy to his superior,<br />

Franklin D. Roosevelt.<br />

Th e chief <strong>of</strong> staff ’s responsibility in peacetime—<strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States was still at peace when Marshall took over—was<br />

to serve “by direction <strong>of</strong> the president,” as “Comm<strong>and</strong>ing General<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Field Forces.” In that capacity he was to direct “fi eld operations<br />

<strong>and</strong> the general training <strong>of</strong> the several Armies, <strong>of</strong> the oversea<br />

forces, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the GHQ units.” If war were to break out, he was to<br />

continue exercising comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the fi eld forces “until such time<br />

as the President shall have specifi cally designated a Comm<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

General there<strong>of</strong>.” 9<br />

Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the<br />

Navy when the fl eet was in port. More about that later.<br />

Th e chief <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>and</strong> the president were the only ones with<br />

legal authority to issue comm<strong>and</strong> orders to the army comm<strong>and</strong>ers<br />

in the fi eld. Th e secretary <strong>of</strong> war, a civilian, was outside this line<br />

<strong>of</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Admiral Richardson, Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-Chief<br />

<strong>of</strong> U.S. Fleet, Relieved <strong>of</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong><br />

In January 1941 Richardson, comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-chief <strong>of</strong> the U.S.<br />

Fleet (CINCUS), was notifi ed that he was being relieved <strong>of</strong> his<br />

comm<strong>and</strong> in about three weeks. Admiral Husb<strong>and</strong> E. Kimmel<br />

was named to replace him, eff ective February 1.<br />

Richardson was “deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet,”<br />

as he wrote later, “there was some feeling <strong>of</strong> prospective relief, for<br />

I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, <strong>and</strong><br />

I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt.” 10<br />

9 Ibid.<br />

10 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> (Washington, D.C.:<br />

Naval History Division, Department <strong>of</strong> the Navy, 1973), p. 420.

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