Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
U.S. Military Plans and Preparations 79 missed this opportunity to become a general. Pershing continued to press Marshall’s case, but to no avail. Marshall was relegated to the position of senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard (1933–1938). 7 Th rough Marshall’s diligence in working with the CCC, he made a number of friends in the Roosevelt administration. He came to know several persons of infl uence, notably Judge Advocate Scott Lucas, later a U.S. senator who was to serve on the 1945- 1946 Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack; Major General Frank McCoy, Stimson’s longtime aide; and Harry Hopkins, FDR’s close adviser. Pershing also continued to support Marshall. Such friends stood him in good stead as the years went by. In July 1938 Marshall was brought to Washington as director of war plans. From then on, with the help of Hopkins and others, Marshall advanced rapidly. He was promoted to brigadier general, eff ective October 1, 1938. On October 15, after only three months in war plans, he was appointed deputy chief of staff . On April 27, 1939, it was announced that Marshall would be advanced over many offi cers with more seniority to become the Army’s new chief of staff . He took over offi cially on September 1, 1939, the very day Hitler’s forces marched into Poland, becoming in the process a temporary four-star general—from one to four stars in less than a year! As chief of staff , Marshall was “the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment.” He was also “charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the military program.” 8 Th e chief of staff ’s obligation was to report directly to 7Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General: 1830–1939, (New York: Viking Adult, 1963), pp. 290–99. 8Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 3, p. 1050. Quoted from Army regulations.
80 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall proved himself to be a loyal and devoted deputy to his superior, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Th e chief of staff ’s responsibility in peacetime—and the United States was still at peace when Marshall took over—was to serve “by direction of the president,” as “Commanding General of the Field Forces.” In that capacity he was to direct “fi eld operations and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea forces, and of the GHQ units.” If war were to break out, he was to continue exercising command of the fi eld forces “until such time as the President shall have specifi cally designated a Commanding General thereof.” 9 Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the Navy when the fl eet was in port. More about that later. Th e chief of staff and the president were the only ones with legal authority to issue command orders to the army commanders in the fi eld. Th e secretary of war, a civilian, was outside this line of command. Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Fleet, Relieved of Command In January 1941 Richardson, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet (CINCUS), was notifi ed that he was being relieved of his command in about three weeks. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was named to replace him, eff ective February 1. Richardson was “deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet,” as he wrote later, “there was some feeling of prospective relief, for I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, and I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt.” 10 9 Ibid. 10 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973), p. 420.
- Page 52 and 53: 2. Foreign Relations in an Election
- Page 54 and 55: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 56 and 57: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 58 and 59: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 60 and 61: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 62 and 63: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 64 and 65: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 66 and 67: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 68 and 69: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 70 and 71: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 72 and 73: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 74 and 75: Foreign Relations in an Election Ye
- Page 76 and 77: 3. U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthene
- Page 78 and 79: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 5
- Page 80 and 81: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 5
- Page 82 and 83: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 5
- Page 84 and 85: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 6
- Page 86 and 87: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 6
- Page 88 and 89: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 6
- Page 90 and 91: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 6
- Page 92 and 93: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 6
- Page 94 and 95: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 7
- Page 96: U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 7
- Page 99 and 100: 76 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 101: 78 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 105 and 106: 82 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 107 and 108: 84 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 109 and 110: 86 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 111 and 112: 88 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 113 and 114: 90 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 115 and 116: 92 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 117 and 118: 94 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 119 and 120: 96 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 121 and 122: 98 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Frui
- Page 123 and 124: 100 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 125 and 126: 102 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 127 and 128: 104 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 129 and 130: 106 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 131 and 132: 108 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 133 and 134: 110 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 135 and 136: 112 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 137 and 138: 114 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 139 and 140: 116 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 141 and 142: 118 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 143 and 144: 120 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 145 and 146: 122 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 147 and 148: 124 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
- Page 149 and 150: 126 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fru
80 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
the president. During the years he served in the post, Marshall<br />
proved himself to be a loyal <strong>and</strong> devoted deputy to his superior,<br />
Franklin D. Roosevelt.<br />
Th e chief <strong>of</strong> staff ’s responsibility in peacetime—<strong>and</strong> the<br />
United States was still at peace when Marshall took over—was<br />
to serve “by direction <strong>of</strong> the president,” as “Comm<strong>and</strong>ing General<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Field Forces.” In that capacity he was to direct “fi eld operations<br />
<strong>and</strong> the general training <strong>of</strong> the several Armies, <strong>of</strong> the oversea<br />
forces, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the GHQ units.” If war were to break out, he was to<br />
continue exercising comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the fi eld forces “until such time<br />
as the President shall have specifi cally designated a Comm<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
General there<strong>of</strong>.” 9<br />
Marshall also had certain responsibilities with respect to the<br />
Navy when the fl eet was in port. More about that later.<br />
Th e chief <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>and</strong> the president were the only ones with<br />
legal authority to issue comm<strong>and</strong> orders to the army comm<strong>and</strong>ers<br />
in the fi eld. Th e secretary <strong>of</strong> war, a civilian, was outside this line<br />
<strong>of</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>.<br />
Admiral Richardson, Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-Chief<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S. Fleet, Relieved <strong>of</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
In January 1941 Richardson, comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-chief <strong>of</strong> the U.S.<br />
Fleet (CINCUS), was notifi ed that he was being relieved <strong>of</strong> his<br />
comm<strong>and</strong> in about three weeks. Admiral Husb<strong>and</strong> E. Kimmel<br />
was named to replace him, eff ective February 1.<br />
Richardson was “deeply disappointed in my detachment, yet,”<br />
as he wrote later, “there was some feeling <strong>of</strong> prospective relief, for<br />
I had never liked to work with people whom I did not trust, <strong>and</strong><br />
I did not trust Franklin D. Roosevelt.” 10<br />
9 Ibid.<br />
10 James O. Richardson, On theTreadmill to <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> (Washington, D.C.:<br />
Naval History Division, Department <strong>of</strong> the Navy, 1973), p. 420.