C - Organized Mobbing
C - Organized Mobbing
C - Organized Mobbing
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
508 CHAPTER NINE<br />
for the open discussion of the accusations. Multiply crosscutting ties e-<br />
tween the women prevented the polarization of the group into two ant ago-<br />
nistic camps. History also treated the group favorably precisely at this mO-<br />
ment. The release of Poppe and Bohley gave everybody a sense of relief,<br />
common purpose and of success. In the end, both friendships and cornlnon<br />
!goals were fortified through the debunking of the Stasi action. What<br />
Stasi intended to destroy found itself to be strengthened.<br />
The Stasi did not fare much better in other projects of decomposition.<br />
Unlike in the case of the letter, the measures were frequently devised<br />
clumsily that after the initial discombobulation gave way to reflection, the<br />
fabricator of the trouble was easily and quickly identified as the secret police,<br />
In such cases the Stasi typically achieved the opposite of what it Wanted.<br />
What worked in the Stasi's favor, however, is the fact that people, at least at<br />
the beginning, did not think of the secret police first when something dis-<br />
quieting had happened to them. Who would imagine that the secret police<br />
took the trouble to rearrange one's desk or the photographs on the wall? In<br />
the face of sexual blackmail, who's first thought is of the security forces of<br />
one's country? The Stasi relied on the fact that common purposes and com-<br />
mon narratives notwithstanding, the members of the peace, environment,<br />
and civil rights movements hailed from different social milieus where trust<br />
first needed to be built against habit. The Stasi could also rely on structural<br />
or institutional fault lines. Tensions between ministers and their congrega-<br />
tions are not uncommon, especially if the former is young and associating<br />
her- or himself with punks and such while the latter is made up chiefly of<br />
older and more sedate members.<br />
Resource deprivation would have been a more effective tool for the Stasi<br />
had the party state not decided to grant the churches institutional auton-<br />
omy. The church did, time and again, provide vital resources for dissidents.<br />
Within limits, it could even provide meaningful employment. Many of the<br />
Stasi officers were painfully aware of how the existence of the church lirn-<br />
ited the efficacy of their actions, their ability to control the movements. My<br />
interview partners were all angry about the "constant abuse of the church."<br />
Hence, the many efforts of the Stasi leadership to confine the church to<br />
matters spiritual. And it might have succeeded had the church not been<br />
so differently organized from the party state, in the sense that at least in<br />
Berlin-Brandenburg it granted lower levels of organization, most notably<br />
the parishes, a high degree of autonomy. The ire of officers is discernible in<br />
the measures of decomposition they had designed for ministers, which in<br />
viciousness are comparable only to those against former party members. In<br />
view ofthe party's project of creating a monolithic intentionality, the church<br />
became an island, nourishing difference, and at its margins, dissidence. It<br />
was not quite the Trojan horse that the Stasi at times imagined it to be with