C - Organized Mobbing

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Attempting to Know and Control the Opposition 507 1 stances the radicalization of the movements could not be in the interest of the Stasi since trials were unlikely to come forth Accordingly, except for those informants who seem to have pursued their personal agenda, in playing their double role as secret informant acting within the Stasi's rules of engagement they could not advance to first tier group leadership positions.39 The problem with selective recognition as a tool of influence was amplified if the recognizing agents were readily identifiable as agents of the state. This was typically the case with the Stasi's use of "social forces," who were often enough recognizable as party members by linguistic register, habitus, and dress. Thus identified they typically became anti-authorities for the activists. As far as recognitions are concerned the epistemic effect of the action thus achieved exactly the opposite of what it was meant to accomplish. What the Stasi could do in the most extreme cases was to literally inundate an open group with the presence of social forces. The effect was produced in such cases not through selective recognition, but by corroborating the fear that party-critical work was futile anj7va): The Pankow peace circle was, for all practical purposes, dissolved in this manner (Lengsfeld 1992). The case of the anonymous letter to the women's group still holds other lessons. In principle the method of planting destructive understandings is limited by the understandings already actualized in the group so that they can enjoy plausibility through their underlying resonances. Since such understandings are often emotive rather than discursive, they take empathy to discover with sufficient precision. With its anonymous letter to the women's group the Stasi had calculated correctly. Its claims obviously hit a raw nerve with the feelings of a significant number of group members. And yet, the discursive culture prevailing in the group enabled the women to work constructively with disagreements. In particular, they resisted the de-authorization of other group members in the face of contradicting recognitions. This success at defusing subversion has an institutional and more contingent basis. Institutionally, the women's resolution of the conflict was enabled by a number of closer, even intimate friendships that offered spaces 38. One of the last acts of Monika Hager as a secret informant was to write a short analysis of how to improve the work nlth secret informants in the Stasi. ?here too she argues that informants should be allowed to become more active to acquire authority within any group (1989 Passim, especially 25). 39. This can be argued, for example, for Wolfgang Wolf (alias "Max") who was a vocal member ofthe Friedrichsfelde peace circle (BVB, AKG, April 12,1989). It can also be argued for Ibrahlm Bbhme (alias "Maximllian") who became an important member of the IFM (Lahann 1992, '09-27) after its near breakdown in 1988 (see below). In the Prenzlauer Berg's poetry scene, Sas- ha Anderson (IM "Fritz Miiller" or "David Menzer") and Rainer Schedlinski (IM "~erhard"), Played a similarly active, and in the Stasi's view, ambiguous role. r
508 CHAPTER NINE for the open discussion of the accusations. Multiply crosscutting ties e- tween the women prevented the polarization of the group into two ant ago- nistic camps. History also treated the group favorably precisely at this mO- ment. The release of Poppe and Bohley gave everybody a sense of relief, common purpose and of success. In the end, both friendships and cornlnon !goals were fortified through the debunking of the Stasi action. What Stasi intended to destroy found itself to be strengthened. The Stasi did not fare much better in other projects of decomposition. Unlike in the case of the letter, the measures were frequently devised clumsily that after the initial discombobulation gave way to reflection, the fabricator of the trouble was easily and quickly identified as the secret police, In such cases the Stasi typically achieved the opposite of what it Wanted. What worked in the Stasi's favor, however, is the fact that people, at least at the beginning, did not think of the secret police first when something dis- quieting had happened to them. Who would imagine that the secret police took the trouble to rearrange one's desk or the photographs on the wall? In the face of sexual blackmail, who's first thought is of the security forces of one's country? The Stasi relied on the fact that common purposes and common narratives notwithstanding, the members of the peace, environment, and civil rights movements hailed from different social milieus where trust first needed to be built against habit. The Stasi could also rely on structural or institutional fault lines. Tensions between ministers and their congrega- tions are not uncommon, especially if the former is young and associating her- or himself with punks and such while the latter is made up chiefly of older and more sedate members. Resource deprivation would have been a more effective tool for the Stasi had the party state not decided to grant the churches institutional autonomy. The church did, time and again, provide vital resources for dissidents. Within limits, it could even provide meaningful employment. Many of the Stasi officers were painfully aware of how the existence of the church lirn- ited the efficacy of their actions, their ability to control the movements. My interview partners were all angry about the "constant abuse of the church." Hence, the many efforts of the Stasi leadership to confine the church to matters spiritual. And it might have succeeded had the church not been so differently organized from the party state, in the sense that at least in Berlin-Brandenburg it granted lower levels of organization, most notably the parishes, a high degree of autonomy. The ire of officers is discernible in the measures of decomposition they had designed for ministers, which in viciousness are comparable only to those against former party members. In view ofthe party's project of creating a monolithic intentionality, the church became an island, nourishing difference, and at its margins, dissidence. It was not quite the Trojan horse that the Stasi at times imagined it to be with
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C - Organized Mobbing

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