C - Organized Mobbing
C - Organized Mobbing C - Organized Mobbing
is its attempt to paralyze the Berlin group Frauen fiir den Frieden by enmeshing it in infighting during the late winter of 1983184. The arrest, the opening of preliminary legal proceedings, and six weeks of jail for Bgrbel ohl ley and Ulrike Poppe derailed the group's activities by spreading fear. ~lthough the imprisonment of the two women fundamentally destabilized processes of institutional maintenance by significantly altering understzndings about the risk involved in the group's work, the arrest itself is not what Stasi meant with decomposition. Yet, the situation resulting from the arrest provided the Stasi with a docking point for a measure of decomposition. When it became clear to other group members that Bohley and Poppe were arrested because they had, unbeknownst to almost all other group members, met a peace activist from New Zealand who wanted to write an article about the them in an English publication (see chapter 7, p. 429), a number of members felt betrayed, even ruthlessly put at risk. This led to an emotional argument between various members both before and after the release of Bohley and Poppe from jail (Kukutz 1995,1310). AS set out in directive 1/76, the Stasi's secret informants were asked to watch the groups they spied on for any possible rifts. Simple character incompatibilities, conflicting ambitions, sexual jealousies, divergent interactional styles, ideological frictions, anything that could lead to distrust or even open animosities among group members was of great interest to the Stasi. The informants were for that reason asked to provide ongoing character assessments as well as atmospheric reports about the state of the group. In the case of Frauen hr den Frieden case officers saw the discussions about the moral valence of the secret meeting between four members of the group with a Westerner as a possible fulcrum for an intervention with the potential to place groups onto a path of destructive self-politics. Through its top-secret informant Monlka Hager (IMB "Karin Lenz") and others, Stasi was well informed about the group's anxieties and controversies surrounding the arrest of Poppe and Bohley. In mid-February the Stasi set out to exploit its clandestinely acquired knowledge for its intended work of destruction. As so often in the Stasi's operations ofdecomposition, the methods used stem from the classic repertoire of intrigue. Some Stasi officer in collaboration with a secret informant-the latter was important to produce a text in an authentic sounding registerconcocted an anonymous letter for circulation in the women's group. Entitling the letter "impulses" (Anregungen), it was distributed to group members in the style of a circular placed directly into their mailboxes.34 The letter indirectly charged Bohley and Poppe with an "arrogant leadership style,'' 34. The original letter is lost. Most members of the group threw it away after it became dear to them of whose pen it was. All references to its content are from other documents citing it directly or indirectly.
504 CHAPTER NINE P as evidenced by their high-handed clandestine meeting with the foreign peace activist. As insinuated by the anonymous letter, this meeting reve aled significant asymmetries of information (and by implication: power) in th e group. Tellingly, the letter also took position against considerations floatin g around at that time to associate the group more formally with the Protestant Church in an effort to better protect its members from Stasi actions. ?his was controversial in the group as it was clear to most members-who were overwhelmingly secular in orientation-that activities planned and con- ducted under the auspices of the church were once more subject to authori- tative approval and de facto restricted by the church's complicated compact with the party state. On February 16,1984, Lieutenant Jager of the department 2 of the minis- try's division XX, the likely author of this measure of decomposition and the guidance officer of secret informant Monika Hager, wrote a report about a meeting with her in which he characterized the effect of the letter on three members of the group who had met two days earlier in Beate Harembskys apartment. iV1 four participants (especially the three not working on be- half of the Stasi) are depicted as agreeing with the basic propositions of the anonymous letter. The officer describes how the informant (the likely coauthor of the letter) chimed in with this sentiment by calling the dynamics of the group as having arrived "at ground zero." Through this recognizing intervention, she thus nudged the interaction even further in the direction of the result desired by the Stasi. The offcer claims that the conversations of the evening and the letter have encouraged the three women to seek an open confrontation with Poppe and Bohley during one of the next meetings. The report concludes: The source [i.e., the informant Hager] is of the opinion that the letter's con- tent and time of distribution will probably deepen the extant contradictions in the women's group. In other words, the guidance officer and his informant are reporting an emergent success of an implemented measure of decomposition to the higher-ups in the Stasi hierarchy. Nine days later, on February 25,1984, officer Jager reports about a report35 of his informant about a conversation she had the day before with Ulrike 35. Although the language in what follows may sound awkward, it is important to keep in mind to which degree the case officers were actually removed from the persons they investigated. Sometimes it would be tempting to add a little number in superscript to the verb "to report" in order to indicate through how many links a particular occurrence was reported. TO say in this notation, if an informant reports' (that is, something he or she has directly witnessed), the guidance officer reports2 and the case officer or analyst summarizing these reports2 actually
- Page 1 and 2: 494 CHAPTER NINE to get out of the
- Page 4 and 5: At~enptlqg lo Know and Control tne
- Page 6 and 7: event by providing the majority of
- Page 8 and 9: In sum, then, the Stasi tried to in
- Page 12 and 13: Atternptlng to Know and Control the
- Page 14 and 15: Attempting to Know and Control the
- Page 16 and 17: Attempting to Know and Control the
- Page 18 and 19: Attempting to Know and Control the
- Page 20 and 21: Attemptln~ to Kno~\ ana Contro Ine
- Page 22 and 23: Attempting to Know and Control the
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is its attempt to paralyze the Berlin group Frauen fiir den Frieden by enmeshing<br />
it in infighting during the late winter of 1983184. The arrest, the<br />
opening of preliminary legal proceedings, and six weeks of jail for Bgrbel<br />
ohl ley and Ulrike Poppe derailed the group's activities by spreading fear.<br />
~lthough the imprisonment of the two women fundamentally destabilized<br />
processes of institutional maintenance by significantly altering understzndings<br />
about the risk involved in the group's work, the arrest itself is not what<br />
Stasi meant with decomposition. Yet, the situation resulting from the arrest<br />
provided the Stasi with a docking point for a measure of decomposition.<br />
When it became clear to other group members that Bohley and Poppe were<br />
arrested because they had, unbeknownst to almost all other group members,<br />
met a peace activist from New Zealand who wanted to write an article<br />
about the them in an English publication (see chapter 7, p. 429), a number of<br />
members felt betrayed, even ruthlessly put at risk. This led to an emotional<br />
argument between various members both before and after the release of<br />
Bohley and Poppe from jail (Kukutz 1995,1310). AS set out in directive 1/76,<br />
the Stasi's secret informants were asked to watch the groups they spied on<br />
for any possible rifts. Simple character incompatibilities, conflicting ambitions,<br />
sexual jealousies, divergent interactional styles, ideological frictions,<br />
anything that could lead to distrust or even open animosities among group<br />
members was of great interest to the Stasi. The informants were for that reason<br />
asked to provide ongoing character assessments as well as atmospheric<br />
reports about the state of the group. In the case of Frauen hr den Frieden<br />
case officers saw the discussions about the moral valence of the secret meeting<br />
between four members of the group with a Westerner as a possible fulcrum<br />
for an intervention with the potential to place groups onto a path of<br />
destructive self-politics. Through its top-secret informant Monlka Hager<br />
(IMB "Karin Lenz") and others, Stasi was well informed about the group's<br />
anxieties and controversies surrounding the arrest of Poppe and Bohley.<br />
In mid-February the Stasi set out to exploit its clandestinely acquired<br />
knowledge for its intended work of destruction. As so often in the Stasi's operations<br />
ofdecomposition, the methods used stem from the classic repertoire<br />
of intrigue. Some Stasi officer in collaboration with a secret informant-the<br />
latter was important to produce a text in an authentic sounding registerconcocted<br />
an anonymous letter for circulation in the women's group. Entitling<br />
the letter "impulses" (Anregungen), it was distributed to group members<br />
in the style of a circular placed directly into their mailboxes.34 The letter<br />
indirectly charged Bohley and Poppe with an "arrogant leadership style,''<br />
34. The original letter is lost. Most members of the group threw it away after it became dear<br />
to them of whose pen it was. All references to its content are from other documents citing it<br />
directly or indirectly.
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