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Joseph Cardinal Höffner CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ... - Ordo Socialis

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lators and governors, but only secondarily and rather ‘administratively’ in the citizens (Thomas<br />

Aquinas II-II, 58,6).<br />

The legislator fulfills the duties of legal justice through a just legislation and administration<br />

above all. It demands of the citizens that they obey the laws and, in case of emergency, support<br />

the common good with property, person, and life. If legal justice is related to the state<br />

above all, it nevertheless enters the picture wherever it is necessary to preserve the common<br />

good. It is in this sense that Cajetan († 1534), for example, speaks of legal justice in the ecclesiastical<br />

realm, whereas Martin de Esparza († 1689) explicitly assigns it to the so-called ‘social’<br />

space as well by inculcating the duties of legal justice within the municipality, the trading<br />

company, and so on.<br />

4. Since the nineteenth century, a fourth kind of justice has customarily been placed next to<br />

the above-mentioned three fundamental forms of justice: social justice. At first, this designation<br />

was only a catchword behind which an unclear wish and demand did indeed stand, but<br />

not a scientific concept. The neoscholastic social philosopher Luigi Taparelli († 1862) was<br />

probably the first to have employed the expression ‘social justice’ in the not very clear sense<br />

of a justice ‘between man and man’. In 1848, Antonio Rosmini held up social justice, the content<br />

of which was unclearly defined, as a guiding principle in his proposal for a model Christian<br />

constitution. At the turn of the century, others designated ‘social justice’, which Thomas<br />

Aquinas allegedly did not know, as a „poisonous fruit of modernism“ and vehemently rejected<br />

both „word and substance.“ 34 In spite of these suspicions, the name spread more and<br />

more in Catholic literature and was taken up under Pius X in the official writings of the Roman<br />

Curia as well. Finally, in1931, the encyclical Quadragesimo anno pushed social justice<br />

so much to the centre that this important letter has been called the ‘encyclical of social justice’.<br />

Is social justice only a new name for a long familiar question, or is it a new law for the construction<br />

of social life that was not at all or not sufficiently noticed earlier? Many equate social<br />

justice with legal justice (e.g. A. Vermeersch, E. Genicot, L. Lachance, and P. Tischleder).<br />

Others limit social justice to natural-law requirements of the common good that are<br />

not established by law (e.g. E. Höring, A.E. Utz). Still others combine both legal and apportioning<br />

justice in the concept of social justice (H. Pesch, O. Schilling, and E. Welty). Others<br />

go further still and interpret social justice as „the harmony between legal, distributive, and<br />

commutative justice correctly conceived (B. Mathis, F. Cavallera).<br />

Whereas the above-mentioned definitions remain within the realms of the traditional three<br />

fundamental forms of justice, others would like to see in social justice a specifically new kind.<br />

Thus, for example, Johannes Messner affirms that social justice orders the relationship of intrasocietal<br />

groups and classes to one another, whereas the familiar division into three is „quite<br />

obviously“ related to the state. Gustav Gundlach, however, seeks to place social justice above<br />

the usual division into three. The three traditional fundamental forms are allegedly of a static<br />

nature; social justice, however, has a dynamic character, shapes the development of the legal<br />

system, and actualizes itself „in the three static forms of justice mentioned above.“<br />

In reality, social justice cannot be interpreted as a fourth fundamental form of cardinal virtue.<br />

It is rather identical with legal justice correctly understood. Those definitions are a priori excluded<br />

that subsume several fundamental forms of the cardinal virtue under social justice. For<br />

since a proper formal object is lacking to such a comprehensive term, a new fundamental<br />

form of justice cannot possibly be meant. Messner’s proposal to limit the scope of social justice<br />

to the relationships between social groups and classes is not convincing either, since a<br />

34 Cf. Jos. <strong>Höffner</strong>, Soziale Gerechtigkeit und soziale Liebe. Saarbrücken 1935, S. 10.<br />

44

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