Joseph Cardinal Höffner CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ... - Ordo Socialis
Joseph Cardinal Höffner CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ... - Ordo Socialis Joseph Cardinal Höffner CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ... - Ordo Socialis
without reference to his free choice, to the unique and exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil” 13, 1 ). In democratic societies, he wrote, the „subjectivity of society“ reveals itself in the „creation of structures of participation and shared responsibility“ (46,2). This was prevented, however; if a majority principle, when applied absolutely, were to undermine the dignity and rights of the individual and the autonomy of social groups and institutions, especially the family, existing within the framework of the public weal (Cf.13,2). A sublime erosion of the subjectivity of society and of the principle of subsidiarity it stands for is the „new type of state“ that was described as the „welfare state“ or „Social Assistance State“(48,4). „By intervening directly and depriving society of its responsibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies ...accompanied by an enormous increase in spending“ (48,5). In many instances, according to „Centesimus annus“, it is the people themselves who are to blame on account of their growing entitlement mentality and their tendency to „shift“ personal responsibility onto the state. This, it says, is partly provoked by the fact that the market only rewards purchasable services but not those non-material goods that are provided especially by the family in the form of child-raising and care inputs, that are also in society’s economic interest. Thus „the individual today is often suffocated between two poles represented by the State and the marketplace”(CA 49,3 ). All this hampered and jeopardized the „subjectivity of society” as a free community of persons, families and social groups responsible for their own actions. SECTION TWO: THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER CHAPTER ONE: THE SOLIDARITY PRINCIPLE § 1 The meaning of the Principle of Solidarity 1. The laws of order governing the life of a society are grounded in the socio-philosophical and socio-theological modes of being that were presented in the section entitled ‘Individual and Society.’ The principle of solidarity follows as the next and immediate conclusion from these modes of being (from solidare= to fit firmly together). It begins simultaneously with the personhood and sociality of man and implies mutual connection and obligation. Individualism, which denies the social nature of man and sees in society only a utilitarian association for the mechanical balancing of individual interests, as well as collectivism, which robs man of his personal dignity and degrades him to a mere object of social and especially economic processes, are thereby rejected as principles of order. The principle of solidarity does not stand somewhere in the middle of individualism and collectivism, but, since it begins simultaneously with the personal dignity and the essentially social nature of man, represents a new and unique statement about the relation between man and society. On the one hand, this principle is grounded in the ontologically pregiven mutual connection of the individual and society (common involvement); on the other hand, it implies the moral responsibility resulting from this mode of being (common liability). It is therefore an ontological and an ethical principle simultaneously. 2. The solidarity principle was scientifically expounded and grounded by Heinrich Pesch, Gustav Gundlach, and Oswald von Nell- Breuning above all. These scholars gave the name ‘solidarism’ to their socio-scientific system - no doubt with the intention of opposing a short and striking catchword to individualism and socialism - so that „solidarism“ would be synonymous with ‘Christian social teaching’. But not even all Catholic social scientists accept this, even if they do recognize the fundamental idea of the solidarity principle. In fact, it is 28
difficult to comprise Christian social teaching under a determinate heading, be it ‘familiarism’ (Gustav Ermecke), ‘Christian socialism’, ‘universalism’ (Othmar Spann), or indeed ‘solidarism’. It is advisable to speak simply of ‘Christian social teaching’ § 2 The Foundations of the Principle of Solidarity 1.Because man is in essence a person and in his personal uniqueness is simultaneously related in essence to society, the building principle of society rests „on an original and characteristic state of relation and connection“ between man and society and permits „in no way a simple reduction to one of the two dimensions.“ From the characteristically dual direction of this tie, which constitutes the metaphysical essence of society, it follows that persons „are tied to the whole from an inner fullness of value,“ „but in such a way that the whole only has its own fullness of value in its dependence on the personal fullness of value of the members.“ 12 2. The German Federal Constitutional Court professed the same principle in its decision of July 20, 1954: „The image of man that Basic Law represents is not that of an isolated, sovereign individual. Basic Law has rather settled the tension between individual and community in the sense of the person’s relatedness to the community and dependence on the community, without thereby violating his or her intrinsic value.“ 13 The encyclical „Sollicitudo rei socialis“ projects the image of a global society based on solidarity: Thus it refers not only to the „internal level of every nation” but, analogously, to the solidarity between nations and peoples as well. This, it says, calls for a fundamental ethical concept of a human culture in which the quality of the whole can only be derived from respect for all individual persons, societies and peoples. .“.. There must be complete respect for the identity of each people with its own historical and cultural characteristics... Both peoples and individuals must enjoy the fundamental equality which is the basis for everybody to share in the process of full development“ (SRS 33,7). CHAPTER TWO: THE COMMON-GOOD PRINCIPLE The solidarity principle, which begins simultaneously with personhood and sociality, raises the question whether both poles of the solidarity relationship face one another on an equal footing, or whether they are superordinated and subordinated to one another. It will be shown that this question cannot be answered with a simple Yes or No, but requires various distinctions. Whereas, in a certain respect, priority attaches to the common good, personhood is, from another and ultimate point of view, the higher value. § 1 Priority of the Common Good over the Individual Interest. 1. for more than two thousand years Western social philosophy has tried to interpret the relation of the individual man to society with the help of the organism analogy - a method that must be applied very carefully since, as history teaches, it can easily be misused for totalitarian purposes. As early as the fifth century BC, Menenius Agrippa is supposed to have reconciled the patricians and the plebeians of Rome with the fable of the divided members that nevertheless form one body in a solidary fashion. In The Republic, Plato compared the „well ordered state“ with a body and its members. Aristotle made use of the organism analogy to gain knowledge of the 12 G. Gundlach, Solidarismus, in: Staatslexikon (1931), IV:. 1614. 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 4, 120 29
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difficult to comprise Christian social teaching under a determinate heading, be it ‘familiarism’<br />
(Gustav Ermecke), ‘Christian socialism’, ‘universalism’ (Othmar Spann), or indeed ‘solidarism’.<br />
It is advisable to speak simply of ‘Christian social teaching’<br />
§ 2 The Foundations of the Principle of Solidarity<br />
1.Because man is in essence a person and in his personal uniqueness is simultaneously related<br />
in essence to society, the building principle of society rests „on an original and characteristic<br />
state of relation and connection“ between man and society and permits „in no way a simple<br />
reduction to one of the two dimensions.“ From the characteristically dual direction of this tie,<br />
which constitutes the metaphysical essence of society, it follows that persons „are tied to the<br />
whole from an inner fullness of value,“ „but in such a way that the whole only has its own<br />
fullness of value in its dependence on the personal fullness of value of the members.“ 12<br />
2. The German Federal Constitutional Court professed the same principle in its decision of<br />
July 20, 1954: „The image of man that Basic Law represents is not that of an isolated, sovereign<br />
individual. Basic Law has rather settled the tension between individual and community<br />
in the sense of the person’s relatedness to the community and dependence on the community,<br />
without thereby violating his or her intrinsic value.“ 13<br />
The encyclical „Sollicitudo rei socialis“ projects the image of a global society based on solidarity:<br />
Thus it refers not only to the „internal level of every nation” but, analogously, to the<br />
solidarity between nations and peoples as well. This, it says, calls for a fundamental ethical<br />
concept of a human culture in which the quality of the whole can only be derived from respect<br />
for all individual persons, societies and peoples. .“.. There must be complete respect for the<br />
identity of each people with its own historical and cultural characteristics... Both peoples and<br />
individuals must enjoy the fundamental equality which is the basis for everybody to share in<br />
the process of full development“ (SRS 33,7).<br />
CHAPTER TWO: THE COMMON-GOOD PRINCIPLE<br />
The solidarity principle, which begins simultaneously with personhood and sociality, raises<br />
the question whether both poles of the solidarity relationship face one another on an equal<br />
footing, or whether they are superordinated and subordinated to one another. It will be shown<br />
that this question cannot be answered with a simple Yes or No, but requires various distinctions.<br />
Whereas, in a certain respect, priority attaches to the common good, personhood is,<br />
from another and ultimate point of view, the higher value.<br />
§ 1 Priority of the Common Good over the Individual Interest.<br />
1. for more than two thousand years Western social philosophy has tried to interpret the relation<br />
of the individual man to society with the help of the organism analogy - a method that<br />
must be applied very carefully since, as history teaches, it can easily be misused for totalitarian<br />
purposes.<br />
As early as the fifth century BC, Menenius Agrippa is supposed to have reconciled the patricians<br />
and the plebeians of Rome with the fable of the divided members that nevertheless form<br />
one body in a solidary fashion. In The Republic, Plato compared the „well ordered state“ with<br />
a body and its members. Aristotle made use of the organism analogy to gain knowledge of the<br />
12 G. Gundlach, Solidarismus, in: Staatslexikon (1931), IV:. 1614.<br />
13 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 4, 120<br />
29