Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

Chapter II — Historical Background
ma’atams. 86 Requests made to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to allow live
broadcasts of Friday sermons from Shia mosques (currently national television
only broadcasts from Sunni mosques) have so far not been granted.
71. On the other hand, many in the Sunni community reject Shia claims
of discrimination and point, for example, to what they argue are exclusively
Shia spheres of influence within certain government ministries. 87 They also
claim that the existence of many affluent Shia families with thriving
businesses in various sectors evidences the absence of a purposeful
governmental policy of economic discrimination against Shia. Furthermore,
they assert that poverty is not a uniquely Shia phenomenon, and that many
Sunnis also suffer from economic disempowerment. Some Sunnis also claim
that the GoB has adopted a policy of appeasement towards Shia, particularly
in the past decade, while it has not been as attentive to Sunni concerns and
grievances. For example, Sunnis contend that a disproportionate number of
naturalised citizens are settled in predominantly Sunni areas, which
occasionally causes clashes between locals and their naturalised neighbours. 88
72. The relationship between the ruling family and the sects and
ethnicities of Bahrain is complex. Although Shia have expressed varying
degrees of criticism of the current political system, there are influential Shia
families who have been known for their close relationship to the Royal
Family. 89 Similarly, although many Sunnis are strongly supportive of the
Royal Family, some Sunni families have a history of political activism and
include leading figures from the opposition movements of the twentieth
century that share the grievances expressed by their Shia compatriots. 90
Overall, some analysts have depicted the Royal Family as seeking to perform
the role of the ultimate and benevolent arbiter between the various religious,
sectarian and ethnic groups of Bahraini society by periodically recognising
and fulfilling the demands of the various groups while maintaining a delicate
balance between them. 91
73. In conclusion, in Bahrain, religious background, sectarian affiliation
and ethnic origin are closely intertwined with political views and economic
86 Justice Minister: Regulating Places of Warship Constitutional, Licensing Maintains
Inviolability (اهتمرح ظفحي صيخرتلا و يروتسد ةدابعلا رود ميظنت :لدعلا ريزو), al-Waqt (12 December
2008)(Arabic Text)
87 Supreme Organ for Ministerial Employments, al-Obeidali Stance towards Iran Intervention
(!!يناريلإا لخدتلا نم يلديبعلا فقوم و تارازولا يف فيظوتلل ايلع ةئيه), al-Watan, (27 April 2011)(Arabic
Text). A 2005 report by the International Crisis Group noted that Shia did indeed “dominate”
certain government ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Industry.
According to the report, over 50% of the senior posts in the latter ministry are staffed by
Shiites. See International Crisis Group, Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge (6 May 2005)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/
Bahrain/Bahrains%20Sectarian%20Challenge.pdf accessed 16 November 2011.
88 Omar Al-Shehabi, Demography and Bahrain’s Unrest (Arab Reform Bulletin, 16 March
2011) http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/demography-and-bahrain-s-unrest/6b7y
accessed 16 November 2011.
89 Fuad Khouri, Tribe and State in Bahrain (University of Chicago Press 1981) pp 41-49.
90 Fuad Khouri, Tribe and State in Bahrain (University of Chicago Press 1981) pp 199-200.
91 Abdulhadi Khalaf, The King’s Dilemma: Obstacles to Political Reform in Bahrain (Fourth
Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, March 2003).
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