Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

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Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (3) Checkpoints 1096. Following the declaration of a State of National Safety on 15 March 2011, PSF units set up many checkpoints on various roads in Manama and neighbouring towns and villages. The primary purpose of these checkpoints was to search persons and vehicles and arrest individuals who were considered to pose a threat to public order. 1097. Evidence gathered by the Commission indicates that the PSF units manning these checkpoints did not use their firearms. However, witness statements and information presented to the Commission indicates that PSF personnel used excessive force when searching vehicles and individuals at these checkpoints. Police personnel routinely physically assaulted individuals stopped at these checkpoints if there was any evidence that they had participated in or supported the protests that had been ongoing in Bahrain. The forms of physical abuse include beating, kicking (including when the person was already lying on the ground) and pushing individuals against cars. 1098. In most cases, this physical abuse occurred despite the fact that victims did not resist arrest and did not pose any threat to PSF units. b) The Use of Force by BDF Units 1099. BDF units were deployed by the GoB on a number of occasions during the events of February/March 2011. The first instance of deployment of BDF units was on the morning of 17 February 2011 during the first clearing of the GCC Roundabout. BDF personnel and armoured personnel carriers were deployed to secure the GCC Roundabout and to deny protesters access to the area. These units set up roadblocks on the main roads leading into the roundabout. 1100. The BDF withdrew from the GCC Roundabout and neighbouring streets on 19 February 2011, upon the initiative of HRH the Crown Prince. BDF units were redeployed during the second clearing operation of the GCC Roundabout, which began at 05:30 on 16 March 2011. On that occasion, the BDF dispatched a larger force that included main battlefield tanks, armoured personnel carriers and two assault helicopters. Large numbers of BDF troops were also involved in clearing protesters from the grounds and buildings of SMC. BDF engineers searched the Bahrain Financial Harbour area and the King Faisal Highway for booby-traps that might have been placed there by protesters. 1101. Following the clearing operation, BDF units enforced a curfew in some areas of Manama and manned roadblocks, denying individuals and vehicles entry into a restricted zone that included the GCC Roundabout and neighbouring roads. These roadblocks were manned by units armed with standard sidearms, M16 assault rifles and .50 Browning machineguns mounted on armoured personnel carriers. 1102. The BDF was not involved in any riot control operations during February or March 2011, or subsequent events. 262
Chapter VI — Allegations of Human Rights Violations Against the Person 1103. The allegations of excessive use of force by BDF units relate to four cases of death that occurred during the events of February/March 2011. All of these cases occurred at or in the vicinity of BDF units that were manning roadblocks. Investigations that were undertaken by the Military Prosecution into these cases concluded that the BDF personnel involved in these incidents complied with the applicable rules of engagement. 557 1104. BDF units also arrested individuals who had violated the terms of the maritime curfew that was imposed in certain areas of Bahrain’s territorial sea. No claims of excessive use of force have been reported in these cases. c) The Use of Force by NSA Units 1105. NSA personnel were not involved in any riot control operations. The only field operations conducted by NSA units related to the execution of arrest warrants issued by the Military Attorney General. This subject is dealt with in Chapter VI, Section C on Manner of Arrests. 558 d) The Use of Force by National Guard Units 1106. No allegations of human rights violations committed by National Guard units were submitted to the Commission. 2. Applicable Law a) International Law 1107. The ICCPR and the Arab Charter are relevant to the use of force by law enforcement officials during the execution of their duties. Specifically, these international instruments protect the rights to life, liberty and security of person. 559 These instruments also guarantee the enjoyment of the freedoms of opinion, expression, and assembly. 560 1108. Overall, the use of force by law enforcement officials is governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality, which, in the case of Bahrain, are reflected in article 13 of the Public Security Forces Law. An assessment of whether the use of force by law enforcement officials is necessary and proportionate can be informed by principles found in international instruments such as the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 561 and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. 562 557 See Chapter VI, Section A. These are the cases of: (i) Abdulredha Mohamed Hasan Buhamaid; (ii) Bahiya Abdelrasool Alaradi; (iii) Stephen Abraham; and (iv) Jawad Ali Kadhem Shamlan. 558 See Chapter VI, Section C. 559 ICCPR, arts 7 and 9; Arab Charter, arts 5 and 14. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 3. 560 ICCPR arts 19 and 21; Arab Charter, arts 24(6) and 32. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 20, 561 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by GA res 34/169 (1979) 17 December 1979. Article 3 of the Code of Conduct states: 263
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a. March 2011 Report of the Bahrain
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Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

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