Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

Recommendations

Info

Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry clear. The Head of Administrative Services at SMC 310 and the Assistant Undersecretary for Primary Healthcare 311 stated that these meetings occurred but added that the general atmosphere at SMC was very tense and that during these two meetings SMC administrators were pressured and, at times, felt threatened. The Commission has seen video footage of medical personnel chanting aggressively and gesticulating outside the room where the meeting was apparently taking place. 706. Similarly, the Head of the Emergency Section, the Deputy Chief of Medical Staff and a BDF doctor stated that the accused doctors were part of a “parallel” programme or plan that aimed to “hijack” the hospital and its administrative systems. 312 For example, it was alleged that there was a plan to take over the hospital paging system used to communicate between members of staff. It was suggested that one of the reasons that the protesters and their supporters among the medical staff wanted to take over the facility was because there was an agreement that SMC was immune from police intervention, and that security agencies were not allowed to enter the facility or use any force in its surroundings. The BDF doctor suggested that the decision to take over SMC would have been taken when the protesters and the political forces behind them felt that they had achieved their “political” purposes and wanted to follow through and capitalise on their success and control a high value site. The Deputy Chief of Medical Staff stated that in the meetings on 19 and 20 February, it seemed that some doctors were trying to take over the administration of SMC and to replace the department heads. This move was rejected, which led them to try and control the entry and exit of patients in the Emergency Section. 707. The Military Attorney General stated in the official indictment that one of the accused doctors led a group of doctors and nurses to rally at the GCC Roundabout, chant anti-regime slogans and occupy Bahrain’s largest hospital in order to further their goal of toppling the regime. He alleged that this group met on 17 February 2011 in the vicinity of the SMC Emergency Section. The following morning, they gathered at the house of one of the accused doctors for a meeting chaired by the leader of the accused doctors. At these meetings, they exchanged statements and discussed developments at the GCC Roundabout. The Military Attorney General alleged that they agreed to draft a statement calling for the sacking of the Minister of Health, while Al Wefaq would file an international complaint in this regard against Bahrain. According to the Military Attorney General the group then staged a silent vigil in the SMC courtyard, whilst on duty, in response to a call made by the doctor in whose house they had met. They read the statement they had drafted, urging the disruption of Bahrain’s security and stability. It was also alleged that on 19 February, the leader of the accused doctors and another accused doctor met at the SMC Radiology Department. They were later joined by a number of the other accused medical personnel. They agreed to meet the following day at 08:00 at the clinic of the leader of the accused doctors in 310 Minutes of court hearing on 20 June 2011 in Case No. 191 of 2011. 311 Interview with the Commission, 30 July 2011. 312 Interview with the Commission, 28 August 2011. 180
Chapter V — Events at Salmaniya Medical Complex order to form committees aimed at mobilising support for the anti-regime protests taking place at the GCC Roundabout. They proceeded by distributing roles among themselves. 708. The GoB alleged that the accused medical personnel were in active collusion with protesters and opposition groups, as well as foreign powers. This included helping protesters to set up tents and a second base at SMC. The GoB’s version of events is mainly based on witness statements. For example, the Deputy Chief of Medical Staff stated that when she asked one of the accused doctors why he was supporting the demonstrators, and why he was helping in the takeover of the hospital, he said that “‘they’ had received promises from the US Embassy to take over the country”. 313 She added that a large meeting was held during which the doctors supporting the opposition made plans to take over SMC. This meeting was held despite the chaos at SMC and the fact that SMC needed the help of these doctors. However, these doctors were more interested in organising the takeover of SMC. This meeting was attended by a number of the accused medical personnel. She added that she had not previously known of the political affiliation of these doctors, but that once the events began they started to announce that they were “Wefaqis”. 709. The Head of Administrative Services at SMC stated that tents were set up at SMC with the knowledge of one of the accused medical doctors. 314 According to the individual alleged to have been the leader of the accused doctors, this accused doctor cooperated with the protesters in setting up the tents, but that none of the other doctors did so. 315 710. On 13 September 2011, the group of 20 medical personnel who were convicted of various felonies submitted the following statement regarding their version of events: 316 We sat together for a coffee on 18 February giving support to each other for what happened on 17 February. Then we started thinking how we could assist the MoH. We decided that we would not do anything without the approval of the MoH. Therefore, the following day there was a meeting with [the Assistant Undersecretary for Hospital Services] to inform him that we as health team members would assist in anyway with his approval and supervision. A meeting was held on Saturday 19 February in response to the events that had happened two days previously. A group of doctors, among them… [the] Assistant Undersecretary for Hospital Services (AUS), attended the meeting. This occurred at around 08:30 on the third floor in the paediatric conference room. The number of doctors exceeded 40 including various consultants. 313 Interview with the Commission, 28 August 2011. 314 Minutes of court hearing on 20 June 2011 in Case No. 191 of 2011 (Military Prosecution Witness). 315 Interview with the Commission, 27 July 2011. 316 Email sent to the Commission on 13 September 2011. 181
Page 1:
REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT C
Page 4 and 5:
Report of the Bahrain Independent C
Page 6 and 7:
Page 8 and 9:
Page 10 and 11:
Page 12 and 13:
Page 14 and 15:
f. Sexual Abuse; g. Rapes; Report o
Page 16 and 17:
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Monday, 21 February 2011 Report of
Page 98 and 99:
Tuesday, 22 February 2011 Report of
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
Page 128 and 129:
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141: Report of the Bahrain Independent C
Page 166 and 167: Tuesday, 22 March 2011 Report of th
Page 230 and 231: d. Deaths of expatriate workers Rep
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Unattributed deaths Report of the B
Page 260 and 261:
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276 and 277:
Page 278 and 279:
Page 280 and 281:
Page 282 and 283:
Page 284 and 285:
Page 286 and 287:
Page 288 and 289:
Page 290 and 291:
Page 292 and 293:
Page 294 and 295:
Page 296 and 297:
Page 298 and 299:
Page 300 and 301:
Page 302 and 303:
Page 304 and 305:
Page 306 and 307:
Page 308 and 309:
Page 310 and 311:
Page 312 and 313:
Page 314 and 315:
Page 316 and 317:
Page 318 and 319:
Page 320 and 321:
Page 322 and 323:
Page 324 and 325:
Page 326 and 327:
Page 328 and 329:
Page 330 and 331:
Page 332 and 333:
a. March 2011 Report of the Bahrain
Page 334 and 335:
Page 336 and 337:
Page 338 and 339:
Page 340 and 341:
Page 342 and 343:
Page 344 and 345:
Page 346 and 347:
Page 348 and 349:
Page 350 and 351:
Page 352 and 353:
Page 354 and 355:
Page 356 and 357:
Page 358 and 359:
Page 360 and 361:
Page 362 and 363:
Page 364 and 365:
Page 366 and 367:
Page 368 and 369:
Page 370 and 371:
Page 372 and 373:
Page 374 and 375:
Page 376 and 377:
Page 378 and 379:
Page 380 and 381:
Page 382 and 383:
Page 384 and 385:
Page 386 and 387:
Page 388 and 389:
Page 390 and 391:
Page 392 and 393:
Page 394 and 395:
Page 396 and 397:
Page 398 and 399:
Page 400 and 401:
Page 402 and 403:
Page 404 and 405:
Page 406 and 407:
Page 408 and 409:
Page 410 and 411:
Page 412 and 413:
Page 414 and 415:
Page 416 and 417:
Page 418 and 419:
Page 420 and 421:
Page 422 and 423:
Page 424 and 425:
Page 426 and 427:
Page 428 and 429:
Page 430 and 431:
Page 432 and 433:
Page 434 and 435:
Page 436 and 437:
Page 438 and 439:
Page 440 and 441:
Page 442 and 443:
Page 444 and 445:
Page 446 and 447:
Page 448 and 449:
CASE NO. 8 (Examined by forensic te
Page 450 and 451:
Page 452 and 453:
Page 454 and 455:
Page 456 and 457:
Page 458 and 459:
Page 460 and 461:
CASE NO. 21 (Examined by forensic t
Page 462 and 463:
Page 464 and 465:
Page 466 and 467:
Page 468 and 469:
Page 470 and 471:
Page 472 and 473:
Page 474 and 475:
Page 476 and 477:
Page 478 and 479:
Page 480 and 481:
Page 482 and 483:
(Examined by forensic team) Date of
Page 484 and 485:
Page 486 and 487:
Page 488 and 489:
Page 490 and 491:
Page 492 and 493:
Article Five. Report of the Bahrain
Page 494 and 495:
Page 496 and 497:
Page 498 and 499:
Page 500 and 501:
Page 502 and 503:
Royal Decrees Royal Orders Report o
Page 504 and 505:
Page 506 and 507:
Page 508 and 509:
Page 510 and 511:
Page 512 and 513:
show all

Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?