Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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<strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
per cent of charitable donations made by <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i individuals and<br />
business corporations went to the religious institutions. Though most<br />
donors did not support the politics of religious parties, they felt that<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>ic education and the preservation of <strong>Islam</strong> were the most worthy<br />
choice for their donations. Many religious leaders who ran the <strong>Islam</strong>ic<br />
seminaries had strong links in Arab countries that went back to the<br />
Afghan jihad. For many it had become a ‘status symbol’ to receive<br />
funding from foreign sources.<br />
Muslims in Britain had been one of the largest donors to the<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i <strong>Islam</strong>ic institutions and Muslim militant groups, some of<br />
whom had been declared terrorists and outlawed by <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s<br />
military government. UK-based charities were the main financiers for<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>ic groups. Diversion of funds for educational and humanitarian<br />
projects to the <strong>Islam</strong>ic militant groups had become a normal practice.<br />
‘It is difficult to separate finances for terror from those for charity,’<br />
said the ICG report. LeT and JeM, reportedly collected more than £5<br />
million each year in mosques in Britain. Although both the groups<br />
were banned in Britain, the Kashmiri diaspora continued to make<br />
donations to them. 26<br />
While <strong>Islam</strong>abad had repeatedly downplayed the link between<br />
extremism and the madrasas, most religious schools continued to<br />
preach jihad. After the failed attempts on Musharraf’s life in December<br />
2003, the administration launched raids on some extremist madrasas,<br />
but such half-hearted and piecemeal measures could hardly help<br />
improve the situation. <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s failure to curb extremism owed less<br />
to the difficulty of implementing reforms than to the administration’s<br />
own unwillingness. Musharraf had promised to ban the use of<br />
mosques and madrasas for spreading religious and sectarian hatred.<br />
However, all those pledges remained largely rhetorical and seemed<br />
to have been made under international pressure. <strong>The</strong> sectarian groups<br />
continued to challenge the authority of the state in different ways.<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s failure to strictly enforce laws against the preaching of<br />
religious hatred and reining in of the extremist madrasas had largely<br />
been responsible for the rise in sectarian-based violence. <strong>The</strong> failure<br />
to deliver to any substantial degree on pledges to reform madrasas<br />
and contain the growth of jihadist networks had not only given rise to<br />
religious extremism in <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>, but also continued to present a threat<br />
to domestic, regional and international security.<br />
Several madrasas continued to provide recruits for Taliban insurgents<br />
in Afghanistan. Run by JUI, part of the coalition government in the