Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Inside Jihad<br />
is in grave danger and the Iraqi mujahidin are fighting for the return of<br />
its glory. <strong>The</strong>y are fighting the forces of evil in an extremely difficult<br />
situation,’ Hafiz Saeed declared in his sermon at a Lahore mosque in<br />
June 2004. 31<br />
Though LeT refrained from indulging in terrorist activities inside<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>, its leaders became increasingly critical of Musharraf’s pro-<br />
American policies and move to reform the madrasas. ‘Most of our<br />
leaders are lapdogs of Americans,’ declared Majjalutul Dawa, a<br />
publication of Jamaat-ud Da’awa.<br />
Despite being seen as a ‘tame’, controllable force, LeT is more<br />
powerful than ever, and looks set for confrontation with the<br />
government on issues which go beyond Kashmir. Simply by carrying<br />
out its recruiting, fundraising and military activities, it contributes to<br />
the radicalization of <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i society. Nonetheless, for as long as the<br />
Kashmiri issue remains unresolved, the government seems prepared<br />
to embrace it.<br />
Unlike Kashmir, Afghanistan is an area where the government’s<br />
objectives and those of their erstwhile jihadist allies became very<br />
different after 9/11. However, precisely because of the extent of<br />
cooperation between the Taliban, the ISI and <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i jihadist<br />
groups in the 1980s, Musharraf has found it very difficult to get the<br />
state security services to effectively implement his policy about-turn.<br />
Taliban-sympathising jihadist groups, such as HuM and JeM, are now<br />
increasingly powerful on the ground in the treacherous border regions<br />
between Afghanistan and <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>.<br />
<strong>The</strong> extent of Taliban/ISI/jihadist cooperation was revealed during<br />
the Indian hostage crisis of 1999, the resolution of which I witnessed<br />
first hand. I sat at Kandahar airport with a group of reporters,<br />
photographers and TV crews just 500 metres from an Indian Airlines<br />
Airbus, the only functional aircraft there. Black-turbaned Taliban<br />
soldiers guarded the plane with more than 155 passengers on board<br />
as negotiations between the hijackers and UN officials dragged on.<br />
Conditions inside the plane were stifling. <strong>The</strong> body of a passenger<br />
killed by the hijackers lay in a pool of blood.<br />
Armed with grenades, pistols and knives, five men had seized flight<br />
IC 814 about 40 minutes after it took off from Kathmandu, Nepal on a<br />
scheduled flight to New Delhi on 24 December 1999. <strong>The</strong> plane had<br />
made stops in India, <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> and the United Arab Emirates before<br />
landing in Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong> hijackers, who called themselves Kashmiri<br />
freedom fighters, had demanded the release of three top <strong>Islam</strong>ic<br />
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