Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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52 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
For Musharraf, the 12 January declaration was more important than<br />
his decision to support the US war on Afghanistan. ‘This sets a direction<br />
for the country, that was a response to a terrorist attack,’ the General<br />
told me a week after his decision that brought him into direct conflict<br />
with the militant groups once sponsored by his intelligence agencies. 2<br />
But he found it hard to root out a deeply entrenched jihadist culture<br />
nurtured by the state for more than two decades.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i jihadist group emerged in 1980 when thousands<br />
of volunteers, mainly students from religious seminaries, joined<br />
the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. By 2002, <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> had<br />
become home to 24 militant groups. 3 Highly disciplined paramilitary<br />
organizations operated in every neighbourhood, pursuing their own<br />
internal and external agenda. <strong>The</strong> largest among them were LeT, JeM,<br />
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkat-al-Jihad-al-<strong>Islam</strong>i (HJI). All<br />
these paramilitary groups, originally from the same source, had similar<br />
motivations and goals, and recruited from the same kind of people<br />
(often unemployed youth from Punjab and the North West Frontier<br />
Province). <strong>The</strong> only difference was in patronage: HuM and HJI were<br />
both strongly linked with the Taliban, whilst LeT had strong links with<br />
Wahabi groups in Saudi Arabia.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se militant organizations were not clandestine nor had they<br />
sprouted surreptitiously. <strong>The</strong>ir growth, if not actually sponsored, had<br />
certainly been looked upon with favour by the state. 4 <strong>The</strong>ir activities<br />
were not secret, and found expression in graffiti, wall posters and<br />
pamphlets all over the country, inviting Muslims to join forces with<br />
them. <strong>The</strong>y also carried addresses and telephone numbers to contact<br />
for training. ‘Jihad is the shortest route to paradise,’ declared one of the<br />
many exhortations. ‘A martyr ensures salvation for the entire family.’<br />
Every jihadist organization had funds to help families of ‘martyrs’.<br />
Although money was not the primary motivation of jihadists, it was<br />
essential to sustain the culture of jihad. 5 <strong>The</strong> state’s patronage helped<br />
the jihadists to raise funds at public places. <strong>The</strong> militant groups had<br />
developed a powerful propaganda machinery. <strong>The</strong>ir publications had<br />
gained a large readership and their messages were also available on<br />
video and audiotapes.<br />
During the 1980s and 1990s, the objective of jihadist movements in<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was not, like that of Arab Salafists such as bin Laden, the establishment<br />
of a global <strong>Islam</strong>ic caliphate. <strong>The</strong>ir objectives were more<br />
in line with the regional strategy of the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i military establishment:<br />
the liberation of Kashmir from India and the installation of a