Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Volte-Face<br />
was eager to reassert its influence in Kabul, it was not possible in the<br />
new power equation that emerged in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.<br />
In December 2001, after much haggling at a conference in Bonn, the<br />
rival Afghan factions agreed to a new interim set-up in Afghanistan<br />
headed by a Pashtun Afghan leader Hamid Karzai. 31 . <strong>The</strong> arrangement<br />
diminished the role of the Northern Alliance, but it remained the most<br />
powerful part of the government, controlling the ministries of defence,<br />
interior and foreign affairs.<br />
Meanwhile, thousands of retreating Taliban officials and fighters<br />
found refuge in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan.<br />
Intense US bombing of their mountainous hideouts in Afghanistan<br />
forced bin Laden and hundreds of his fighters to flee into <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>,<br />
leading to a new and prolonged phase of the anti-terror war on<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s territory. <strong>The</strong> vast lawless tribal border regions made<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> attractive to jihadist recruits and militants seeking refuge. It<br />
also provided a base for operations against US-led coalition forces in<br />
Afghanistan. <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> became the backyard of America’s war on terror<br />
and its war in Afghanistan.<br />
Musharraf’s support for the US war on terror brought huge economic<br />
and political dividends to his country. From a pariah state, <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
became the centre of focus of the international community. Never<br />
before had so many head of states travelled to <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> as they did,<br />
in the few weeks after 11 September. <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was, once more, the<br />
USA’s strategic partner. <strong>The</strong> military government did not negotiate<br />
any economic aid package in return for its cooperation with the USA.<br />
Musharraf thought it was quite unbecoming at that time to be talking<br />
of money. ‘I made it a point not to be talking on these issues, but yes,<br />
an indication of cooperation and assistance to <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>, understanding<br />
our internal problems, that was there.’ 32<br />
<strong>The</strong> economic aid and concessions from the USA and other western<br />
countries to <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> increased considerably after the collapse of the<br />
Taliban regime. <strong>The</strong>se included a $1 billion loan write-off, $600 million<br />
in budgetary support and debt rescheduling. Such a rescheduling had<br />
taken place many times in the past, but the scale of concession allowed<br />
in the post-9/11 period, particularly in December 2001, largely a<br />
payback to General Musharraf for his cooperation in the war on terror,<br />
was extraordinary. <strong>The</strong> $12.5 billion debt rescheduling was not only<br />
far larger than any in the past, but the terms of the agreement were<br />
also much more favourable. Basically the entire bilateral debt of the<br />
consortium countries was rescheduled for a far greater period than in