Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

Volte-Face
was eager to reassert its influence in Kabul, it was not possible in the
new power equation that emerged in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.
In December 2001, after much haggling at a conference in Bonn, the
rival Afghan factions agreed to a new interim set-up in Afghanistan
headed by a Pashtun Afghan leader Hamid Karzai. 31 . The arrangement
diminished the role of the Northern Alliance, but it remained the most
powerful part of the government, controlling the ministries of defence,
interior and foreign affairs.
Meanwhile, thousands of retreating Taliban officials and fighters
found refuge in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan.
Intense US bombing of their mountainous hideouts in Afghanistan
forced bin Laden and hundreds of his fighters to flee into Pakistan,
leading to a new and prolonged phase of the anti-terror war on
Pakistan’s territory. The vast lawless tribal border regions made
Pakistan attractive to jihadist recruits and militants seeking refuge. It
also provided a base for operations against US-led coalition forces in
Afghanistan. Pakistan became the backyard of America’s war on terror
and its war in Afghanistan.
Musharraf’s support for the US war on terror brought huge economic
and political dividends to his country. From a pariah state, Pakistan
became the centre of focus of the international community. Never
before had so many head of states travelled to Pakistan as they did,
in the few weeks after 11 September. Pakistan was, once more, the
USA’s strategic partner. The military government did not negotiate
any economic aid package in return for its cooperation with the USA.
Musharraf thought it was quite unbecoming at that time to be talking
of money. ‘I made it a point not to be talking on these issues, but yes,
an indication of cooperation and assistance to Pakistan, understanding
our internal problems, that was there.’ 32
The economic aid and concessions from the USA and other western
countries to Pakistan increased considerably after the collapse of the
Taliban regime. These included a $1 billion loan write-off, $600 million
in budgetary support and debt rescheduling. Such a rescheduling had
taken place many times in the past, but the scale of concession allowed
in the post-9/11 period, particularly in December 2001, largely a
payback to General Musharraf for his cooperation in the war on terror,
was extraordinary. The $12.5 billion debt rescheduling was not only
far larger than any in the past, but the terms of the agreement were
also much more favourable. Basically the entire bilateral debt of the
consortium countries was rescheduled for a far greater period than in