Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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<strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
in January 2002, appearing much more relaxed and basking in his<br />
new-found international role. ‘No democratically elected government<br />
could have moved so quickly,’ he added. 28<br />
General Mahmood’s removal was important, but it did not solve all<br />
the problems. Many senior officers harboured strong anti-American<br />
sentiments and obviously resented <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> fighting what they<br />
described as ‘America’s dirty war’. ‘I hate to work with the Americans,’<br />
a senior ISI brigadier told me. ‘I wish they get bogged down in<br />
Afghanistan.’ Some of them refused to accept that al-Qaeda or Muslims<br />
were responsible for the 11 September attacks. It was going to be very<br />
difficult for them to break their associations and change their opinions<br />
after collaborating with militant <strong>Islam</strong>ists for so long.<br />
Musharraf chose Lt.-General Ehsan ul-Haq, a moderate officer with<br />
a strong intelligence background, as the new ISI chief. A Pashtun from<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s North West Frontier Province, he had earlier served as head<br />
of Military Intelligence and was known for his middle-of-the-road<br />
views. One of his first jobs was to revamp the agency and to weed out<br />
those officers who had a long association with the <strong>Islam</strong>ic militants.<br />
General Haq signalled a significant change in course, disbanding<br />
two major units of the ISI that had close links to <strong>Islam</strong>ic militants in<br />
Afghanistan and Kashmir.<br />
<strong>The</strong> move was seen as one of most significant shifts emerging<br />
from Musharraf’s decision to align his country with the USA and to<br />
reduce ties with <strong>Islam</strong>ic militants there and in Kashmir. <strong>The</strong> measure<br />
resulted in the transfer of perhaps 40 per cent of forces assigned to<br />
the ISI, which drew most of its manpower from the military. <strong>The</strong><br />
action also served a major purpose of purging the ‘Taliban cell’ set<br />
up in the intelligence agency by General Mahmood. <strong>The</strong> American<br />
intelligence officials reportedly helped in compiling a list of suspect<br />
pro-<strong>Islam</strong>ic officers who were to be removed from the organization.<br />
Despite the massive changes, the ISI’s links with the <strong>Islam</strong>ists were<br />
never successfully severed. <strong>The</strong>y found it difficult to leave the old<br />
linkages behind. Nevertheless, the ISI helped tilt the balance in the<br />
battle in Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong> withdrawal of the ISI’s support catalysed the<br />
swift fall of the Taliban regime. <strong>The</strong> agency, which had been deeply<br />
involved with the Taliban from its inception, guided the American<br />
forces in ousting its own creation.<br />
Unlike his predecessor, General Haq kept a low profile, but became<br />
a key member of Musharraf’s inner coterie. <strong>The</strong> ISI had assumed a<br />
much greater importance not only because of its new-found role in the