Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

Volte-Face
Afghan policy. There was no way Pakistan could have delivered what
the Americans were demanding, with some top generals not in full
agreement. General Musharraf was also not very happy with General
Mahmood’s arrogant style, and for not consulting him before agreeing
to Armitage’s seven-point demands. Though the President would
have given his consent, he did not like being bypassed. A new policy
needed a new team.
On 7 October 2001, just three weeks after his decision to join the
US war on terror, Musharraf sacked General Mahmood and sidelined
three other top generals known for their hardline Islamic views in a
major shake-up of the army top brass. Initially, Musharraf just wanted
to remove General Mahmood from the ISI and offered to elevate him
to the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which
he refused. General Aziz reluctantly accepted the job. ‘I just want to
know whether it is your own decision or are you doing it because
America wanted it?’ General Aziz asked his boss. General Musharraf
replied that it was his decision. 27 General Usmani simply resigned
after being superseded by the appointment of General Mohammed
Yousuf to the newly created post of Vice Chief of the Army Staff and
General Gulzar Kiani as Quarter Master General. Ironically, in his new
position of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Aziz
coordinated with the Pentagon for logistical support for ‘Operation
Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan.
The changes coincided with the launching of the joint US-British
military operation in Afghanistan, and were seen as a part of General
Musharraf’s plan to appoint to key positions those officers who would
support his pro-West policy shift. The shake-up in the army high
command changed the entire composition of the junta, which had ruled
the country since seizing power in October 1999 and consolidated
General Musharraf’s position as the sole power centre. In the past,
every decision taken by the cabinet and the National Security Council
had to be stamped by the powerful coterie of generals. The top brass
now bore a totally new and liberal image, tailored to the requirement
of the new situation with Pakistan trying to cut its umbilical cord with
militant Islam and the Taliban.
With no peer, Musharraf could now operate much more freely. The
removal of the hardline generals from the decision-making process
came as a great relief to the USA as well. Within a few weeks of 11
September, Musharraf had swept aside five of his top 13 generals. ‘The
critical element of strategy are timing, space and strength,’ he told me