Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Volte-Face<br />
Afghan policy. <strong>The</strong>re was no way <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> could have delivered what<br />
the Americans were demanding, with some top generals not in full<br />
agreement. General Musharraf was also not very happy with General<br />
Mahmood’s arrogant style, and for not consulting him before agreeing<br />
to Armitage’s seven-point demands. Though the President would<br />
have given his consent, he did not like being bypassed. A new policy<br />
needed a new team.<br />
On 7 October 2001, just three weeks after his decision to join the<br />
US war on terror, Musharraf sacked General Mahmood and sidelined<br />
three other top generals known for their hardline <strong>Islam</strong>ic views in a<br />
major shake-up of the army top brass. Initially, Musharraf just wanted<br />
to remove General Mahmood from the ISI and offered to elevate him<br />
to the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which<br />
he refused. General Aziz reluctantly accepted the job. ‘I just want to<br />
know whether it is your own decision or are you doing it because<br />
America wanted it?’ General Aziz asked his boss. General Musharraf<br />
replied that it was his decision. 27 General Usmani simply resigned<br />
after being superseded by the appointment of General Mohammed<br />
Yousuf to the newly created post of Vice Chief of the Army Staff and<br />
General Gulzar Kiani as Quarter Master General. Ironically, in his new<br />
position of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Aziz<br />
coordinated with the Pentagon for logistical support for ‘Operation<br />
Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan.<br />
<strong>The</strong> changes coincided with the launching of the joint US-British<br />
military operation in Afghanistan, and were seen as a part of General<br />
Musharraf’s plan to appoint to key positions those officers who would<br />
support his pro-West policy shift. <strong>The</strong> shake-up in the army high<br />
command changed the entire composition of the junta, which had ruled<br />
the country since seizing power in October 1999 and consolidated<br />
General Musharraf’s position as the sole power centre. In the past,<br />
every decision taken by the cabinet and the National Security Council<br />
had to be stamped by the powerful coterie of generals. <strong>The</strong> top brass<br />
now bore a totally new and liberal image, tailored to the requirement<br />
of the new situation with <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> trying to cut its umbilical cord with<br />
militant <strong>Islam</strong> and the Taliban.<br />
<strong>With</strong> no peer, Musharraf could now operate much more freely. <strong>The</strong><br />
removal of the hardline generals from the decision-making process<br />
came as a great relief to the USA as well. <strong>With</strong>in a few weeks of 11<br />
September, Musharraf had swept aside five of his top 13 generals. ‘<strong>The</strong><br />
critical element of strategy are timing, space and strength,’ he told me