Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Volte-Face<br />
on Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong>re were only a few feeble voices in the cabinet<br />
expressing concern over the possible public backlash. But largely it<br />
was a tame affair.<br />
General Musharraf did not find it hard to convince his handpicked<br />
civilian cabinet, but it was not so smooth when it came to his top<br />
commanders and members of his military junta. <strong>The</strong>re was a complete<br />
division over the issue. At least four top commanders, including General<br />
Mahmood who had earlier, in Washington, signed on the dotted line,<br />
showed reservations on the decision to provide unqualified support<br />
to the United States in its war on Afghanistan. Lt.-General Mohammed<br />
Aziz, Corps Commander Lahore, Lt.-General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani,<br />
Corps Commander, Rawalpindi, and Lt.-General Muzaffar Usmani,<br />
Deputy Chief of Army Staff, were among those who opposed pulling<br />
out support for the Taliban regime. <strong>The</strong>y had all played key roles in<br />
the 1999 military coup. Musharraf, however, had the backing of other<br />
corps commanders. It was a precarious situation for him.<br />
He could certainly not backtrack. He tried to persuade Washington<br />
to delay the attack on Afghanistan and give diplomacy a last chance.<br />
He thought there was still a possibility of persuading Mullah Omar to<br />
hand over bin Laden and avoid military action. He was worried about<br />
an extremist backlash against the US attack on a Muslim country and<br />
his government’s support for it. General Musharraf expressed his concern<br />
about the domestic fall out to the American ambassador during<br />
his long meeting with her on 15 September. ‘<strong>The</strong>se decisions are not<br />
very easy and we need understanding from the United States and also<br />
support from them, so that I can take the nation along with me in our<br />
fight against terrorism,’ General Musharraf recalled telling her. He was,<br />
perhaps, more concerned about the reaction within the military.<br />
Donning his military uniform, General Musharraf looked stressed<br />
as he appeared on state television on the evening of 19 September<br />
to explain why he had decided to side with the USA in the war on<br />
terror. His tone was highly defensive as he told his countrymen how<br />
hard he had tried to defend the Taliban against all odds. He justified<br />
his decision saying it was done to save the country’s strategic assets,<br />
safeguard the cause of Kashmir and prevent <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> from being<br />
declared a terrorist state.<br />
He chose the occasion to warn India to ‘lay off’ <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> at that<br />
moment of crisis. <strong>The</strong> speech was aimed at defusing domestic<br />
opposition and to assure the military that by sacrificing the Taliban, he<br />
had protected <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s vital interests. 18<br />
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