Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Volte-Face<br />
fighting machine and their role was crucial in the coming battles.<br />
Frustrated by the inaction, Washington became openly critical of<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> for supporting the Taliban offensive to complete their control<br />
over Afghanistan. In December, the United Nations Security Council<br />
imposed fresh sanctions against the Taliban regime, calling for bin<br />
Laden’s expulsion and forbidding any country to provide them with<br />
arms or military assistance. <strong>The</strong> latest sanction, however, did little<br />
to stop <strong>Islam</strong>abad from continuing to supply weapons and financial<br />
aid to its ally. <strong>The</strong>re was a complete stalemate in US relations with<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> in Clinton’s final year as President. <strong>The</strong> administration had<br />
little incentive to offer with congressional nuclear- and democracyrelated<br />
sanctions against <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>. <strong>The</strong> US ‘stick heavy’ policy failed to<br />
force <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> to cooperate. 14<br />
Immediately after his inauguration, President Bush raised the<br />
terrorism issue with <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s military ruler; in February 2001, he<br />
sent a letter to General Musharraf seeking his support in dealing with<br />
terrorism. He emphasized that bin Laden and al-Qaeda were a direct<br />
threat to the United States and its interests and that this threat had to be<br />
addressed. 15 <strong>The</strong>re was, however, a clear shift in the approach of the<br />
new US administration. Instead of just using the stick, Secretary of State<br />
Colin Powell recommended providing some incentives to persuade<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> to cooperate. To break the logjam, the US administration<br />
moved to pursue a policy of enhanced engagement with <strong>Islam</strong>abad<br />
and also considered lifting some of the sanctions against the military<br />
government. But, because of a negative view of <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> on Capitol<br />
Hill, the idea of lifting sanctions could not make much headway. On 4<br />
August, President Bush again wrote to President Musharraf registering<br />
his concern over terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and requested<br />
him to engage actively against al-Qaeda. 16<br />
Although <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s leverage over the Taliban had weakened<br />
over the years and relations between them had become quite testy,<br />
Musharraf was not willing to pull support completely. He snapped<br />
shut a green folder containing a letter from Mullah Omar when I and<br />
a colleague from Newsweek arrived in the first week of February 2001<br />
for an interview at his office in the Army General Headquarters in<br />
Rawalpindi. Mullah Omar’s letter was in reply to Musharraf’s message<br />
that had drawn the Afghan leader’s attention to the international<br />
concern over the terrorism issue. ‘I told him he must address the<br />
problems of terrorism, religious extremism and the gender issue to<br />
improve the Taliban’s image,’ he told us, but there was no indication