Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

Volte-Face
fighting machine and their role was crucial in the coming battles.
Frustrated by the inaction, Washington became openly critical of
Pakistan for supporting the Taliban offensive to complete their control
over Afghanistan. In December, the United Nations Security Council
imposed fresh sanctions against the Taliban regime, calling for bin
Laden’s expulsion and forbidding any country to provide them with
arms or military assistance. The latest sanction, however, did little
to stop Islamabad from continuing to supply weapons and financial
aid to its ally. There was a complete stalemate in US relations with
Pakistan in Clinton’s final year as President. The administration had
little incentive to offer with congressional nuclear- and democracyrelated
sanctions against Pakistan. The US ‘stick heavy’ policy failed to
force Pakistan to cooperate. 14
Immediately after his inauguration, President Bush raised the
terrorism issue with Pakistan’s military ruler; in February 2001, he
sent a letter to General Musharraf seeking his support in dealing with
terrorism. He emphasized that bin Laden and al-Qaeda were a direct
threat to the United States and its interests and that this threat had to be
addressed. 15 There was, however, a clear shift in the approach of the
new US administration. Instead of just using the stick, Secretary of State
Colin Powell recommended providing some incentives to persuade
Pakistan to cooperate. To break the logjam, the US administration
moved to pursue a policy of enhanced engagement with Islamabad
and also considered lifting some of the sanctions against the military
government. But, because of a negative view of Pakistan on Capitol
Hill, the idea of lifting sanctions could not make much headway. On 4
August, President Bush again wrote to President Musharraf registering
his concern over terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and requested
him to engage actively against al-Qaeda. 16
Although Pakistan’s leverage over the Taliban had weakened
over the years and relations between them had become quite testy,
Musharraf was not willing to pull support completely. He snapped
shut a green folder containing a letter from Mullah Omar when I and
a colleague from Newsweek arrived in the first week of February 2001
for an interview at his office in the Army General Headquarters in
Rawalpindi. Mullah Omar’s letter was in reply to Musharraf’s message
that had drawn the Afghan leader’s attention to the international
concern over the terrorism issue. ‘I told him he must address the
problems of terrorism, religious extremism and the gender issue to
improve the Taliban’s image,’ he told us, but there was no indication