Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

Frontline Pakistan
Such a large-scale induction of army personnel into civilian affairs
was unprecedented even in Pakistan. The growing dependence
on the army created its own predicament. Increasingly tasked with
administration of civilian affairs, the army top brass wanted more
political power in the state. This led to tensions between the army and
Sharif, who was determined not to cede power to anyone.
Sharif had picked General Pervez Musharraf ahead of two senior
generals as the new army chief. He deliberately chose a man from
the Mohajir minority ethnic group to head a predominantly Punjabi
army, assuming that he would not be able to challenge an all-powerful
Punjabi Prime Minister. But he failed to understand that the conflict
with the army had a strong institutional dimension and was not simply
about personalities. He erroneously assumed that the army would
remain subservient to his rule once he had put in a man of his own
choice at the top. For Sharif it was a game of persons. For the army it
was an institutional matter.
The trigger for the eventual showdown between the army chief and
the Prime Minister came in May 1999, following Sharif’s peace talks
with India, at which point Musharraf decided to revive the faltering
campaign in Kashmir without telling the Prime Minister. The Pakistani
army sent in soldiers to occupy Indian positions in the Kargil peaks,
which the Indian army traditionally vacated during winter. The move
led to a stand-off with India, and a terrified Sharif had almost begged
President Clinton to mediate. He was forced to make a humiliating
climbdown, which provoked an inevitable backlash from militants at
home. By the time he tried to reassert himself by sacking Musharraf
in October, it was already clear that it was, as it had always been, the
radical military, not the elected government, who was in the driving
seat in Pakistan.