Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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1 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
convinced Bhutto of his absolute loyalty and more importantly of his<br />
incapacity to be otherwise. 7<br />
Zia was not only an authoritarian; he also aspired to turn <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
into an ideological state ruled by strict <strong>Islam</strong>ic sharia laws. He was<br />
an unpopular and controversial leader, whose survival in power<br />
largely owed to the external factors that emerged after the invasion by<br />
Soviet forces of <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s northern neighbour, Afghanistan, in 1979.<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> became a frontline state and a bulwark in the West’s war<br />
against communism.<br />
General Zia brought in his close confidant, Lt.-General Akhter<br />
Abdur Rehman, to head the ISI in 1979, as the spy agency became<br />
a crucial cog in the resistance against the Soviet forces. Its tentacles<br />
started to spread far and wide. An artillery officer, General Rehman<br />
‘had a cold, reserved personality, almost inscrutable, always secretive,<br />
with no intimates except his family.’ His officers remembered him as<br />
a hard man to serve due to his brusque manner and reputation as a<br />
strict disciplinarian. 8 ‘That made him an ideal man for the job,’ said<br />
Brigadier Mohammed Yousuf, a former ISI officer who served under<br />
him. General Rehman ran the organization until 1987. He was not a<br />
radical <strong>Islam</strong>ist, but a staunch Muslim nationalist.<br />
Under General Rehman, the ISI, in partnership with the CIA,<br />
conducted the biggest covert operation in modern history. <strong>The</strong> two<br />
organizations had secretly collaborated for years, yet General Zia<br />
was not prepared to give a free hand to the CIA. He laid down strict<br />
rules to ensure that the ISI would maintain control over contacts with<br />
Afghan mujahidin groups. No CIA operatives would be allowed to<br />
cross the border into Afghanistan. Distribution of weapons to the<br />
Afghan commanders would be handled only by the ISI. All training of<br />
mujahidin would be the sole responsibility of the ISI. While the CIA<br />
supplied money and weapons, it was the ISI that moved them into<br />
Afghanistan. 9 <strong>The</strong> Americans relied almost entirely on the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i<br />
service to allocate weapons to the mujahidin groups. <strong>The</strong> framework<br />
provided the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i spy agency with almost total control over the<br />
covert operation inside Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong> decade-long secret war raised<br />
the organization’s profile and gave it huge clout. <strong>With</strong> the active help<br />
of the CIA and Saudi Arabia, the ISI turned the Afghan resistance into<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>’s holy war.<br />
<strong>The</strong> decade-long conflict in Afghanistan gave the <strong>Islam</strong>ic extremists<br />
a rallying point and a training field. Young Muslims around the world<br />
flocked to Afghanistan to fight against a foreign invader. Some 35,000