Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

1 Frontline Pakistan
The scion of a feudal family of Sindh and a former foreign minister,
Bhutto was seen as the savior of the new Pakistan. He successfully
negotiated with India the release of 90,000 troops taken prisoner by
Indian forces. He had come to power with the largest support base of
any Pakistani leader since the inception of the country in 1947. But he
failed to sustain the confidence of the nation. Bhutto was ideally placed
to put into practice the objective of social democracy and develop
secular ideas and institutions. But it did not happen. Bhutto’s strategy
was to bring the disparate elements of this divided society together
through a kind of Islamic nationalism, which was then supposed to
create the cohesion and stability necessary for socialist economic
reforms, but unfortunately all Bhutto succeeded in doing was to
rehabilitate religious extremism. Under pressure from the religious
parties whose cooperation they were courting, Bhutto’s government
increased the religious content in school syllabuses and, succumbing
to pressure from Saudi Arabia as well as to the demands of religious
parties, declared the Ahmedis, an Islamic sect, to be non-Muslim. 4 This
apparently minor action had long-term implications for the country as
it fuelled Islamic zealotry and sharpened the sectarian divide. Bhutto’s
attempt to co-opt religious elements merely emboldened them, and
eventually the clergy joined hands with their traditional ally, the
military, to plot the overthrow of his government.
Bhutto’s attempt to establish an authoritarian rule led him to rely more
and more on the coercive apparatus of the state and the intelligence
agencies. Bhutto did little to strengthen democratic institutions and
to make the process of democratic reform irreversible. Instead, his
entire effort was aimed at promoting a personalized rule. He did not
trust anyone. Given his overwhelming paranoia and insecurity, Bhutto
geared up the ISI to keep surveillance not only on his opponents,
but also on his own party men and cabinet ministers. The agency
kept dossiers on politicians, bureaucrats, judges and anyone else
considered important.
The collapse of democratic institutions and the Constitution’s loss
of sanctity created a vacuum of authority that provided a favourable
condition for the Bonapartist generals. Bhutto’s use of the army to crush
the uprising in Pakistan’s western province of Balochistan provided an
opportunity to the military to reassert itself in the country’s politics.
Bhutto’s politics of expediency and attempts to appease the country’s
religious lobby allowed the Islamists, who were routed in the 1971
elections, to revive themselves. A nationwide agitation, led by right-