Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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1 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
the hostile relations between newly nuclearized India and <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re has also been concern of the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i nuclear device falling<br />
into the hands of <strong>Islam</strong>ic extremists and passed on to other countries.<br />
<strong>The</strong> worry was not without basis.<br />
For almost three decades, the US and western intelligence had been<br />
investigating Dr Khan’s suspected ties with the international nuclear<br />
black-market network, since he began assembling components for<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s bomb. <strong>The</strong> first indication that Dr Khan’s network traded in<br />
bomb designs and nuclear technology emerged in 1995, after United<br />
Nations inspectors in Iraq discovered some documents describing an<br />
offer made to Baghdad before the 1990–1991 Gulf War. According to<br />
an internal Iraqi memorandum, dated 10 June 1990, an unidentified<br />
middleman claiming to represent Dr Khan had offered Saddam Hussein<br />
help to ‘establish a project to enrich uranium and manufacture a<br />
nuclear weapon’. 20 <strong>The</strong>re were also some reports that Dr Khan himself<br />
had made several clandestine trips to Iraq.<br />
In 1998, <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i government investigated the middleman’s letter<br />
at the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and<br />
declared the offer a fraud. <strong>The</strong> nuclear agency listed the memo as a<br />
key unresolved issue in a 1999 UN report on Iraq’s arms programmes.<br />
Meanwhile, American authorities had gathered some evidence on<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s nuclear cooperation with North Korea. In the summer of<br />
2001, American spy satellites spotted missile parts being loaded into<br />
a <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i cargo plane near the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.<br />
<strong>The</strong> parts were delivered in return for <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s nuclear technology. 21<br />
<strong>The</strong> report led to some US sanctions against KRL, but Washington was<br />
still hesitant to impose sanctions against <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> for nuclear transfer<br />
because of insufficient evidence.<br />
Musharraf had a strong dislike for Dr Khan. ‘He is bad news,’ he<br />
often said privately of Khan. <strong>The</strong> increasing American pressure<br />
offered a good opportunity to sideline the scientist. In March 2001,<br />
he removed Dr Khan as head of KRL and appointed him presidential<br />
adviser on science, with the rank of federal minister, a post he held<br />
until January 2004. Dr Khan was stunned when he heard the news<br />
on national television. At first he refused to accept the move, but had<br />
little choice. <strong>The</strong> action did not satisfy the American administration.<br />
<strong>The</strong> US officials suspected that the exchanges with North Korea had<br />
continued even after Dr Khan’s removal. In July 2002, US spy satellites<br />
again spotted <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i military cargo planes picking up missile parts<br />
in North Korea. Meanwhile, in June 2001, the US Deputy Secretary of