Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

1 Frontline Pakistan
facility for foreign and Pakistani militants. Several hundred Uzbek,
Chechen and Arab militants lurked inside, training, recruiting and
plotting attacks in Pakistan and the West and operating a sophisticated
propaganda factory, complete with video-editing machines and CD
burners. At least 15 camps had operated under the protection of
sympathetic tribesmen, mostly around Wana and Shakai. 4 In early
spring 2004, just a week before the start of General Khattak’s military
campaign, senior al-Qaeda leaders had gathered there for a ‘terror
summit’. Among those who attended was Abu Faraj al-Libbi, 5 who
would become bin Laden’s top operational planner. Many al-Qaeda
operatives from other countries had travelled to this remote region
to participate in the meeting. At the top of the agenda that day were
plans to carry out attacks on the USA and Britain. 6
Musharraf had faced mounting American pressure to capture bin
Laden and move against the terrorist network operating from the
border region. US jets had frequently bombed al-Qaeda and Taliban
sanctuaries inside Waziristan as America’s frustration with Pakistan’s
inaction grew. Musharraf told tribal leaders that American forces could
enter the region if the militant sanctuaries were not dismantled. In
March 2004, George Tenet, the CIA Director, made a secret trip to
Islamabad to discuss a new strategy with senior Pakistani military and
intelligence officials to rout al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives from the
tribal areas. American troops had already stepped up activities across
the border in the Afghan provinces. US military officials had hoped
that efforts by Pakistan, combined with a change in American counterinsurgency
tactics in Afghanistan, would create a ‘hammer-and-anvil’
effect to trap al-Qaeda fighters between US and Pakistani forces. Some
20,000 US troops had been involved in the military campaign against
al-Qaeda and Taliban rebels in Afghanistan and, as part of the new
anti-terrorist strategy, the Pakistani army was to work as ‘the anvil’. 7
The military campaign in Waziristan coincided with a visit to
Pakistan in March by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The
Bush administration had offered a carrot by asking Congress for a
five-year, $3 billion assistance package and designating Pakistan as
a significant non-Nato ally, clearing the way for its military to acquire
new weapons systems from the USA. 8 The operation was being paid
for with millions of dollars from the CIA, supported with equipment
from the National Security Agency and carried out by Pakistani soldiers
and intelligence units. There were also a limited number of US military
personnel assisting Pakistani forces involved in the hunt for al-Qaeda