Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

War Comes Home
senior police official, terrorist groups multiplied with the intensification
in the crackdown against Islamic militants. Some of these groups were
involved in sectarian attacks, but others targeted western assets and
security forces. Most of these cells had just four or five members,
making them much more effective.
The militants responded to the arrest of key Pakistani and al-Qaeda
activists with a suicide bomb attack targeting the Prime Minister-designate,
Shaukat Aziz, during his election campaign in the city of Attock.
A former Citibank executive, who served as Musharraf’s finance minister
since the military takeover, Aziz was accused of being an American
agent by radical Islamic groups. He escaped unhurt, but his driver
and eight others were killed. An obscure group, the Islamboli Brigade
– a group that officials allege is linked to al-Qaeda (it took its name
from Anwar Sadat’s killer) – claimed responsibility for the attack. In
a message posted on an Arabic news website, the group warned of a
series of retaliatory strikes if the government handed over detained
al-Qaeda operatives to the USA. ‘One of our blessed battalions tried to
hunt down the head of one of America’s infidels in Pakistan, but God
wanted him to survive,’ said the message, which also warned of a series
of violent strikes if Musharraf did not change his pro-US policy. 61
Since 9/11, Pakistan had delivered hundreds of al-Qaeda fugitives,
but there was still no trace of the most wanted man. American and
Afghan leaders had appeared convinced about bin Laden’s presence
in Pakistan and that possibility generated shudders in Pakistan’s military
establishment. In June 2005, Porter J. Goss, the Director of the
CIA, said he had ‘an excellent idea’ where bin Laden was hiding, but
lamented that the al-Qaeda leader had taken advantage of ‘sanctuaries
in sovereign states’ beyond American reach. Although Goss did not
name Pakistan, it was very much implicit. The capture of the man who
was regarded by hardline Islamists, and even by the majority of common
Pakistanis, as a hero, would completely destabilize the government.
Was Musharraf, America’s most trusted ally, prepared to risk his
life and power by capturing the world’s most dangerous man?
The possibility of seizing bin Laden presented a serious dilemma
for Musharraf. While his capture would further boost US support for
the Pakistani President, it could also cause a serious public backlash.
The Islamists could use the issue to whip up anti-government and
anti-American sentiments in the country and this might have been one
of the reasons behind the insistence by Musharraf and other senior
Pakistani government officials that bin Laden was not in the country,
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