Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

War Comes Home
as the people holding Pearl had different intentions. 18 Sheikh definitely
lost control once Khalid Sheikh Mohammed arrived on the scene.
Sheikh refused to defend himself in his trial before an anti-terrorism
court, saying, ‘it was a waste of time,’ and warned of a ‘decisive war
between Islam and the infidels’. He appeared defiant as the judge
pronounced him guilty of conspiring in Pearl’s kidnapping and
sentenced him to death. ‘We will see whether those who want to see
me dead succeed or get killed first,’ he declared as he was shifted
to a death cell in Hyderabad prison. 19 His reference was clearly to
Musharraf, whom he had already been plotting to assassinate.
Pakistani intelligence agencies were the least equipped to deal
with the new situation that had developed after the fall of the Taliban
regime. Hundreds of foreign operatives fleeing from Afghanistan were
looking to turn Pakistan into a new base for their terror operations.
A more sophisticated intelligence network was required to counter
the new threat. Developments since 9/11 had led to radical changes
in the ISI, but it still took several months for the agency to develop
a sound counter-terrorism infrastructure to track the network, whose
tentacles had spread from the inhospitable mountains in the lawless
tribal region, to bustling city neigbourhoods.
Pakistani authorities set up a new Counter Terrorism Cell (CTC)
within the ISI to hunt down al-Qaeda fugitives. Headed by a Brigadier,
the cell worked closely with the FBI and CIA. It had set up a
swift-acting internal anti-terrorism department with specially trained
personnel. The spy agency had vast experience in intelligence and
counter-intelligence activities, but fighting terrorism was an entirely
new experience. Pakistan had also established a National Crisis Management
Cell, within the Interior Ministry to meet the new terrorism
challenge. Headed by an active-duty brigadier, the cell worked closely
with the FBI.
With new high-tech equipment and better human intelligence in
place, al-Qaeda operatives lurking in Pakistani cities became more
vulnerable to capture. The CIA had developed extensive intelligence
assets that had helped track important al-Qaeda leaders hiding in
Pakistan. The agency had also used huge amounts of money to buy
information. All of that had helped in netting top al-Qaeda operatives.
It was in a crowded town, rather than the lawless tribal area, that the
US and the Pakistani intelligence agents bagged their first big catch.
Just before dawn on 28 March 2002, scores of FBI agents and
members of Pakistani security forces stormed a two-storey modest
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