Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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11 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
statement also declared that both leaders were ‘confident’ of reaching<br />
a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir. It was<br />
a great leap forward in the relations between the two countries, which<br />
had been on the brink of nuclear war just a year before.<br />
<strong>The</strong> outcome of the <strong>Islam</strong>abad meeting was not the result of a<br />
sudden surge of goodwill. <strong>The</strong> script was prepared after intensive<br />
back-channel diplomacy between Brajesh Mishra and Tariq Aziz. From<br />
1 to 4 January, the two officials were in regular contact. Mishra also<br />
met with the ISI chief, Lt.-General Ehsan ul-Haq. Those interactions<br />
remained secret, even from <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i foreign ministry officials. Only<br />
the President’s Chief of Army Staff, General Hamid, and Tariq Aziz<br />
were involved in the preparation of the joint communiqué. Foreign<br />
Secretary, Riaz Khokar, was handed a copy just a few hours before<br />
the summit meeting. 29 Musharraf’s change of course on the Kashmir<br />
policy indicated that the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i military establishment had finally<br />
acknowledged that support for militancy could not dislodge India from<br />
the disputed land. But there had also been concern that, in the absence<br />
of such pressure, India would not agree to a negotiated settlement of<br />
the Kashmir dispute. Vajpayee’s agreement on a composite dialogue<br />
on all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, gave Musharraf some leeway<br />
to convince his generals of the need for peace with India.<br />
Musharraf went one step further when he declared his readiness<br />
to consider all possible alternatives for the Kashmir solution. In<br />
November 2004, he outlined a step-by-step approach towards<br />
resolving the decades-old dispute, which involved making some<br />
parts of the disputed territory independent or placing them under<br />
joint Indian-<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i control. Indeed, the suggestion to identify the<br />
region, demilitarize it and change its status, signified a radical shift in<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s Kashmir policy. 30<br />
Though premature, the proposal indicated a significant come-down<br />
from <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s traditional hardline position of holding a plebiscite,<br />
under the 1948 UN resolution that required Kashmiris alone to decide<br />
their political future. For the first time, a <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i leader had suggested<br />
making the territory a joint protectorate.<br />
Finding a solution acceptable to both sides had always been a difficult<br />
task, even in the best of circumstances, as Kashmir has been so deeply<br />
intertwined with India and <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s perceptions of national security<br />
and identity. Domestic political compulsions had made the issue more<br />
complex. What had made securing peace even more difficult was the<br />
past baggage of mistrust and suspicion the two nations continued to