Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

11 Frontline Pakistan
statement also declared that both leaders were ‘confident’ of reaching
a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir. It was
a great leap forward in the relations between the two countries, which
had been on the brink of nuclear war just a year before.
The outcome of the Islamabad meeting was not the result of a
sudden surge of goodwill. The script was prepared after intensive
back-channel diplomacy between Brajesh Mishra and Tariq Aziz. From
1 to 4 January, the two officials were in regular contact. Mishra also
met with the ISI chief, Lt.-General Ehsan ul-Haq. Those interactions
remained secret, even from Pakistani foreign ministry officials. Only
the President’s Chief of Army Staff, General Hamid, and Tariq Aziz
were involved in the preparation of the joint communiqué. Foreign
Secretary, Riaz Khokar, was handed a copy just a few hours before
the summit meeting. 29 Musharraf’s change of course on the Kashmir
policy indicated that the Pakistani military establishment had finally
acknowledged that support for militancy could not dislodge India from
the disputed land. But there had also been concern that, in the absence
of such pressure, India would not agree to a negotiated settlement of
the Kashmir dispute. Vajpayee’s agreement on a composite dialogue
on all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, gave Musharraf some leeway
to convince his generals of the need for peace with India.
Musharraf went one step further when he declared his readiness
to consider all possible alternatives for the Kashmir solution. In
November 2004, he outlined a step-by-step approach towards
resolving the decades-old dispute, which involved making some
parts of the disputed territory independent or placing them under
joint Indian-Pakistani control. Indeed, the suggestion to identify the
region, demilitarize it and change its status, signified a radical shift in
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. 30
Though premature, the proposal indicated a significant come-down
from Pakistan’s traditional hardline position of holding a plebiscite,
under the 1948 UN resolution that required Kashmiris alone to decide
their political future. For the first time, a Pakistani leader had suggested
making the territory a joint protectorate.
Finding a solution acceptable to both sides had always been a difficult
task, even in the best of circumstances, as Kashmir has been so deeply
intertwined with India and Pakistan’s perceptions of national security
and identity. Domestic political compulsions had made the issue more
complex. What had made securing peace even more difficult was the
past baggage of mistrust and suspicion the two nations continued to