Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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11 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
and dealing and had no experience of diplomacy. However, being<br />
Musharraf’s closest aide, he was considered the best man for this<br />
secret and extremely delicate job. Even the foreign ministry was kept<br />
out of the loop. Facilitated by the USA, this was the first senior official<br />
contact between the two countries for nearly two years. Tariq Aziz<br />
was later appointed secretary of the National Security Council.<br />
In April 2003, the Indian Prime Minister extended a ‘hand of<br />
friendship’ to <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> during a public address in Srinagar. <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s<br />
Prime Minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, responded by speaking to<br />
Vajpayee and invited him to visit <strong>Islam</strong>abad.In yet another highly<br />
symbolic gesture, India announced the resumption of bus links with<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>. <strong>The</strong> twice-weekly coach service between Delhi and Lahore<br />
had been abruptly suspended 18 months earlier, after <strong>Islam</strong>ic militants<br />
had attacked the Indian Parliament in Delhi. <strong>The</strong> bus service, which<br />
started in February 1999, had significant symbolic value. Vajpayee had<br />
travelled to Lahore by the inaugural coach for his historic meeting with<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif.<br />
Given their deep-rooted mistrust of each other, the process<br />
remained a slow diplomatic dance, with the two governments circling<br />
one another warily, each making tentative offers. <strong>The</strong> efforts at that<br />
stage were largely aimed at de-escalation and the restoration of the<br />
situation that existed prior to the military stand-off, rather than any<br />
great leap forward.<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> moved very cautiously, given its traditional suspicion of<br />
its much bigger, and militarily powerful, neighbour. It was reluctant<br />
to open its airspace to Indian planes and remove all trade barriers.<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> feared that lifting the overflight ban could provide India with<br />
an opportunity to establish close trade links with, and consolidate<br />
its influence in, Afghanistan. <strong>The</strong>re were strong apprehensions in<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>abad that the emerging process could prove to be another false<br />
start if India raised the size of the table, rather than picking up the<br />
thread from previous talks.<br />
Kashmir remained the thorniest issue as the two countries moved<br />
towards a rapprochement. <strong>The</strong> events of May and June a year before<br />
had indicated how quickly the situation could escalate into a fully<br />
fledged conflagration, with both countries appearing all too willing to<br />
engage in nuclear sabre-rattling. <strong>The</strong>re was no sign of flexibility yet on<br />
the Kashmir issue on either side. While India was eager to demonstrate<br />
that the Kashmir violence was totally <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i sponsored, <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
appeared equally adamant to keep up the pressure on Delhi.