Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Kashmir<br />
11<br />
border to help their Kashmiri brethren. <strong>The</strong>y were not prepared to give<br />
up the cause on <strong>Islam</strong>abad’s orders. As an inevitable consequence of<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s policy of using jihad as an instrument of covert war, some<br />
elements within the intelligence agencies had been radicalized by the<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>ists. <strong>The</strong> handlers had become coloured by the ideology of the<br />
militants. <strong>The</strong>y were unhappy with Musharraf’s decision to support<br />
America’s war on Afghanistan’s <strong>Islam</strong>ic regime, which they had<br />
helped install. But even deeper was the resentment on the reversal<br />
in Kashmir. <strong>The</strong>re was a strong anti-American feeling in the military<br />
ranks. Many officers believed that western countries, particularly the<br />
USA, had not come to <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s support when it faced the threat of<br />
war from its nuclear rival.<br />
Once again Musharraf was walking a tightrope. His position had<br />
become even more tenuous after he ordered his troops to stop the<br />
infiltration. He had come to the conclusion that there was now a<br />
conflict of interest between the militants and the military. But it was<br />
not clear whether other army officers agreed with him. <strong>The</strong>re was a<br />
strong feeling in the army that India was trying to humiliate them by<br />
dictating terms for peace. Some hardline retired generals, who had<br />
been responsible for organizing the Kashmiri ‘jihad’, warned Musharraf<br />
that there was a limit to how far the army would go along with a policy<br />
of using force against those who were seen as fighting for <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s<br />
interest in Kashmir. Lt.-General Hamid Gul, a former ISI chief and<br />
a fiercely anti-American former commander, accused Musharraf of<br />
‘going too far in appeasing the west’ and taking a ‘step back’ on the<br />
Kashmir issue. ‘By calling those attacking the Indian forces, terrorists,<br />
General Musharraf is only echoing the Indian position,’ he declared. 27<br />
Despite military de-escalation, there was a wide gap between what<br />
the Indian leaders demanded and what Musharraf could deliver. India’s<br />
mistrust of the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i military leadership had thwarted all moves by<br />
the international community to bring the two sides to the negotiating<br />
table. It was only after the relatively peaceful polls for the Kashmir<br />
state assembly in October 2002, that Delhi and <strong>Islam</strong>abad opened<br />
secret back-channel diplomacy. Beginning in April 2003, Vajpayee’s<br />
Principal Secretary, Brajesh Mishra, and Musharraf’s top aide, Tariq<br />
Aziz, held several meetings in London, Dubai and Bangkok exploring<br />
avenues to begin a peace process. 28<br />
A seasoned bureaucrat, Tariq Aziz was a college-mate of Musharraf’s<br />
and had worked as his principal secretary after the military takeover.<br />
A former income tax officer, he was more into political wheeling