Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

Kashmir
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border to help their Kashmiri brethren. They were not prepared to give
up the cause on Islamabad’s orders. As an inevitable consequence of
Pakistan’s policy of using jihad as an instrument of covert war, some
elements within the intelligence agencies had been radicalized by the
Islamists. The handlers had become coloured by the ideology of the
militants. They were unhappy with Musharraf’s decision to support
America’s war on Afghanistan’s Islamic regime, which they had
helped install. But even deeper was the resentment on the reversal
in Kashmir. There was a strong anti-American feeling in the military
ranks. Many officers believed that western countries, particularly the
USA, had not come to Pakistan’s support when it faced the threat of
war from its nuclear rival.
Once again Musharraf was walking a tightrope. His position had
become even more tenuous after he ordered his troops to stop the
infiltration. He had come to the conclusion that there was now a
conflict of interest between the militants and the military. But it was
not clear whether other army officers agreed with him. There was a
strong feeling in the army that India was trying to humiliate them by
dictating terms for peace. Some hardline retired generals, who had
been responsible for organizing the Kashmiri ‘jihad’, warned Musharraf
that there was a limit to how far the army would go along with a policy
of using force against those who were seen as fighting for Pakistan’s
interest in Kashmir. Lt.-General Hamid Gul, a former ISI chief and
a fiercely anti-American former commander, accused Musharraf of
‘going too far in appeasing the west’ and taking a ‘step back’ on the
Kashmir issue. ‘By calling those attacking the Indian forces, terrorists,
General Musharraf is only echoing the Indian position,’ he declared. 27
Despite military de-escalation, there was a wide gap between what
the Indian leaders demanded and what Musharraf could deliver. India’s
mistrust of the Pakistani military leadership had thwarted all moves by
the international community to bring the two sides to the negotiating
table. It was only after the relatively peaceful polls for the Kashmir
state assembly in October 2002, that Delhi and Islamabad opened
secret back-channel diplomacy. Beginning in April 2003, Vajpayee’s
Principal Secretary, Brajesh Mishra, and Musharraf’s top aide, Tariq
Aziz, held several meetings in London, Dubai and Bangkok exploring
avenues to begin a peace process. 28
A seasoned bureaucrat, Tariq Aziz was a college-mate of Musharraf’s
and had worked as his principal secretary after the military takeover.
A former income tax officer, he was more into political wheeling