Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
10 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
high alert and in forward positions. <strong>The</strong> Indian leaders wanted to see<br />
whether Musharraf’s pledge was translated into practice. <strong>The</strong>y refused<br />
to resume negotiations and normalize relations with <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> until all<br />
their conditions were met, including their extradition demands.<br />
Musharraf’s 12 January speech drew domestic as well international,<br />
support. But the measures taken by his government were insufficient<br />
against the activities of the jihadist groups. <strong>The</strong> ban was not applied to<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i-controlled Kashmir, or the semi-autonomous tribal areas bordering<br />
Afghanistan, which enabled militant organizations to shift their<br />
infrastructure and cadres to these regions. Hundreds of <strong>Islam</strong>ic militants,<br />
returning from Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime in<br />
December 2001, had moved to the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i part of Kashmir and were<br />
ready to join the armed struggle on the other side of the border. Most of<br />
these militants belonged to the three outlawed <strong>Islam</strong>ic groups.<br />
It became apparent that, while promising to curb <strong>Islam</strong>ic extremism<br />
and sectarianism, Musharraf was still not willing to completely delink<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>abad’s connection with the Kashmiri militants. Meanwhile,<br />
India’s refusal to pull back troops from advance positions and resume<br />
negotiations with <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> also tied his hands. Cross-border infiltration<br />
of militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir slowed down, but never<br />
completely stopped. Most of the militants detained following the 12<br />
January declaration, were released. On 20 March 2002, the CIA chief,<br />
George Tenet, told the United States Senate Armed Services Committee<br />
that the chances of war in the region were the highest since 1971.<br />
In the midst of the military stand-off with India, Musharraf decided<br />
to hold a referendum to extend his term in the office of President. In<br />
his address to the nation in March 2001, Musharraf declared his intent<br />
to enter politics and stay at the helm, a far cry from the ‘reluctant coupmaker’<br />
of October 1999. <strong>With</strong> a feeling of déjà vu in the air, Musharraf<br />
announced that he was seeking public approval for an extension of<br />
his tenure in office, for an additional five years beyond the three-yearperiod<br />
stipulated by the Supreme Court. 15 <strong>The</strong> General also announced<br />
plans to introduce a new political formula, which he claimed was in<br />
conformity with the country’s requirement for progress and stability.<br />
He declared that the military would continue to play a dominant role in<br />
the new political system, which was to emerge after the parliamentary<br />
elections scheduled for October 2002. Predictably, Musharraf received<br />
more than 90 per cent of the votes in a highly rigged referendum<br />
held in April 2002. <strong>The</strong> dubious polls not only dented Musharraf’s<br />
credibility, but also sharpened the political polarization as the country