Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

10 Frontline Pakistan
high alert and in forward positions. The Indian leaders wanted to see
whether Musharraf’s pledge was translated into practice. They refused
to resume negotiations and normalize relations with Pakistan until all
their conditions were met, including their extradition demands.
Musharraf’s 12 January speech drew domestic as well international,
support. But the measures taken by his government were insufficient
against the activities of the jihadist groups. The ban was not applied to
Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, or the semi-autonomous tribal areas bordering
Afghanistan, which enabled militant organizations to shift their
infrastructure and cadres to these regions. Hundreds of Islamic militants,
returning from Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban regime in
December 2001, had moved to the Pakistani part of Kashmir and were
ready to join the armed struggle on the other side of the border. Most of
these militants belonged to the three outlawed Islamic groups.
It became apparent that, while promising to curb Islamic extremism
and sectarianism, Musharraf was still not willing to completely delink
Islamabad’s connection with the Kashmiri militants. Meanwhile,
India’s refusal to pull back troops from advance positions and resume
negotiations with Pakistan also tied his hands. Cross-border infiltration
of militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir slowed down, but never
completely stopped. Most of the militants detained following the 12
January declaration, were released. On 20 March 2002, the CIA chief,
George Tenet, told the United States Senate Armed Services Committee
that the chances of war in the region were the highest since 1971.
In the midst of the military stand-off with India, Musharraf decided
to hold a referendum to extend his term in the office of President. In
his address to the nation in March 2001, Musharraf declared his intent
to enter politics and stay at the helm, a far cry from the ‘reluctant coupmaker’
of October 1999. With a feeling of déjà vu in the air, Musharraf
announced that he was seeking public approval for an extension of
his tenure in office, for an additional five years beyond the three-yearperiod
stipulated by the Supreme Court. 15 The General also announced
plans to introduce a new political formula, which he claimed was in
conformity with the country’s requirement for progress and stability.
He declared that the military would continue to play a dominant role in
the new political system, which was to emerge after the parliamentary
elections scheduled for October 2002. Predictably, Musharraf received
more than 90 per cent of the votes in a highly rigged referendum
held in April 2002. The dubious polls not only dented Musharraf’s
credibility, but also sharpened the political polarization as the country