Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

10 Frontline Pakistan
sign of a thaw came in June 2001, when the two countries agreed
to a ceasefire along the 1,000-kilometre Line of Control, dividing the
Indian and Pakistani sides of the disputed territory. 3 That helped to
ease tensions and cleared the way for the first high level government
contact between the two countries. In July 2001, the Indian Prime
Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, invited Musharraf for talks after dropping
his precondition that Pakistan should first put an end to the infiltration
of militants into Kashmir. That put the onus on Musharraf to come up
with some offer to defuse tensions.
Musharraf was under tremendous strain when he proceeded
to Delhi for talks with the Indian leader. Closely watched by both
hardliners and peaceniks, often with contrary agendas, General
Musharraf walked a political tightrope. He was under scrutiny, not
only by the conservative, militant Islamic groups, but also by the
hardline generals. The Jamaat-i-Islami and Islamic militant groups had
warned him not to deviate from a single point of the Kashmir agenda. 4
His own future was at stake, and dependent on the outcome of the
most crucial diplomatic mission he had ever undertaken. His hardline
generals were opposed to any concession on Kashmir. The officers, a
number of whom had served in the ISI, argued that it was the ‘success
of jihad’ that had forced India to come to the negotiating table. They
wanted Musharraf to continue supporting the Islamic militants fighting
the Indian forces.
Although he had appeared stronger with his ascension to the
presidency, Musharraf continued to face growing domestic opposition
to the perpetuation of military rule. The pressure on Musharraf not to
let the talks fail was enormous, as Pakistani leaders had constantly been
calling for a negotiated settlement of disputes with India. However,
any room to manoeuvre was restricted by the long-standing, thorny
Kashmir issue, which was the major cause for the festering conflict in
the region.
While the summit was made possible largely because of strong
international pressure, 5 it had created its own dynamics. There were
strong internal pressures forcing both countries to start a dialogue.
For Musharraf, in order to prevent Pakistan from economic collapse,
it was important to ease tension with India. A few weeks before his
departure to India, in an interview on Pakistan state television, he had
declared that Pakistan’s economy was not compatible with its defence
capability. A de-escalation was necessary, to win the support of the
international community and to restart the flow of foreign aid.