Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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10 <strong>Frontline</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong><br />
sign of a thaw came in June 2001, when the two countries agreed<br />
to a ceasefire along the 1,000-kilometre Line of Control, dividing the<br />
Indian and <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i sides of the disputed territory. 3 That helped to<br />
ease tensions and cleared the way for the first high level government<br />
contact between the two countries. In July 2001, the Indian Prime<br />
Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, invited Musharraf for talks after dropping<br />
his precondition that <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> should first put an end to the infiltration<br />
of militants into Kashmir. That put the onus on Musharraf to come up<br />
with some offer to defuse tensions.<br />
Musharraf was under tremendous strain when he proceeded<br />
to Delhi for talks with the Indian leader. Closely watched by both<br />
hardliners and peaceniks, often with contrary agendas, General<br />
Musharraf walked a political tightrope. He was under scrutiny, not<br />
only by the conservative, militant <strong>Islam</strong>ic groups, but also by the<br />
hardline generals. <strong>The</strong> Jamaat-i-<strong>Islam</strong>i and <strong>Islam</strong>ic militant groups had<br />
warned him not to deviate from a single point of the Kashmir agenda. 4<br />
His own future was at stake, and dependent on the outcome of the<br />
most crucial diplomatic mission he had ever undertaken. His hardline<br />
generals were opposed to any concession on Kashmir. <strong>The</strong> officers, a<br />
number of whom had served in the ISI, argued that it was the ‘success<br />
of jihad’ that had forced India to come to the negotiating table. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
wanted Musharraf to continue supporting the <strong>Islam</strong>ic militants fighting<br />
the Indian forces.<br />
Although he had appeared stronger with his ascension to the<br />
presidency, Musharraf continued to face growing domestic opposition<br />
to the perpetuation of military rule. <strong>The</strong> pressure on Musharraf not to<br />
let the talks fail was enormous, as <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i leaders had constantly been<br />
calling for a negotiated settlement of disputes with India. However,<br />
any room to manoeuvre was restricted by the long-standing, thorny<br />
Kashmir issue, which was the major cause for the festering conflict in<br />
the region.<br />
While the summit was made possible largely because of strong<br />
international pressure, 5 it had created its own dynamics. <strong>The</strong>re were<br />
strong internal pressures forcing both countries to start a dialogue.<br />
For Musharraf, in order to prevent <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> from economic collapse,<br />
it was important to ease tension with India. A few weeks before his<br />
departure to India, in an interview on <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> state television, he had<br />
declared that <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s economy was not compatible with its defence<br />
capability. A de-escalation was necessary, to win the support of the<br />
international community and to restart the flow of foreign aid.