Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Kashmir<br />
outstanding issues, including the Kashmir dispute, through bilateral<br />
negotiations. Musharraf was more categorical this time in his pledge to<br />
switch off the tap for Kashmiri militants. He had promised to curb the<br />
jihadists before, but in the past he had hedged his bets, ordering only<br />
a temporary halt, in the hope that India would reciprocate by sitting<br />
down for talks. 1<br />
<strong>With</strong> India back to the negotiating table and after two assassination<br />
attempts on him involving jihadist groups, Musharraf had more reason<br />
than ever to crack down on his home-grown militants. He could<br />
not allow the militants to take over the country. His tone became<br />
increasingly conciliatory towards India and he hinted that he was<br />
willing to drop <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s long-standing demand that a plebiscite be<br />
held in Kashmir under the 1948 UN resolution to determine its status<br />
as long as India was equally forthcoming.<br />
Musharraf’s peace overtures had angered the militants, who accused<br />
him of having conceded too much ground to India by reversing<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s long-standing aggressive Kashmir policy. <strong>The</strong> jihadists<br />
saw the war in ideological and civilizational terms. Any concession<br />
to the ‘enemy’ was therefore a very serious matter. Many <strong>Islam</strong>ist<br />
leaders described the peace process as the beginning of the end of<br />
the Kashmir jihad.<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>abad’s policy shift was also driven by external factors.<br />
Musharraf’s change of tack had also placed him on the horns of a<br />
serious dilemma. <strong>Islam</strong>abad’s new role as a key US ally in the war on<br />
terror was no longer compatible with <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s use of those proxies,<br />
which underscored its Kashmir policy. Yet, while Musharraf was quick<br />
to abandon support for the Taliban, he was reluctant to break ties with<br />
the militants waging ‘a holy war’ in Kashmir.<br />
In fact, Musharraf had sought to use his country’s broad cooperation<br />
with the United States to gain some leeway for continuing <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s<br />
proxy war in the disputed Himalayan state. He tried to draw a fine line<br />
between what he described as ‘freedom fighters’ and terrorists. But<br />
America was not interested in such distinctions.<br />
For more than half a century, the Kashmir cause had been almost<br />
the raison d’être for <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s existence – not to mention for the role<br />
of the armed forces in the politics of the state. 2 Musharraf’s assumption<br />
of power had alarmed India at the time, as he was known for his<br />
aggressive stance on Kashmir. Once in power, however, Musharraf<br />
displayed the pragmatic tendencies which would later cause him to<br />
disappoint fighters like Mohammed Ashfaque so bitterly. <strong>The</strong> first<br />
10