Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

Kashmir
outstanding issues, including the Kashmir dispute, through bilateral
negotiations. Musharraf was more categorical this time in his pledge to
switch off the tap for Kashmiri militants. He had promised to curb the
jihadists before, but in the past he had hedged his bets, ordering only
a temporary halt, in the hope that India would reciprocate by sitting
down for talks. 1
With India back to the negotiating table and after two assassination
attempts on him involving jihadist groups, Musharraf had more reason
than ever to crack down on his home-grown militants. He could
not allow the militants to take over the country. His tone became
increasingly conciliatory towards India and he hinted that he was
willing to drop Pakistan’s long-standing demand that a plebiscite be
held in Kashmir under the 1948 UN resolution to determine its status
as long as India was equally forthcoming.
Musharraf’s peace overtures had angered the militants, who accused
him of having conceded too much ground to India by reversing
Pakistan’s long-standing aggressive Kashmir policy. The jihadists
saw the war in ideological and civilizational terms. Any concession
to the ‘enemy’ was therefore a very serious matter. Many Islamist
leaders described the peace process as the beginning of the end of
the Kashmir jihad.
Islamabad’s policy shift was also driven by external factors.
Musharraf’s change of tack had also placed him on the horns of a
serious dilemma. Islamabad’s new role as a key US ally in the war on
terror was no longer compatible with Pakistan’s use of those proxies,
which underscored its Kashmir policy. Yet, while Musharraf was quick
to abandon support for the Taliban, he was reluctant to break ties with
the militants waging ‘a holy war’ in Kashmir.
In fact, Musharraf had sought to use his country’s broad cooperation
with the United States to gain some leeway for continuing Pakistan’s
proxy war in the disputed Himalayan state. He tried to draw a fine line
between what he described as ‘freedom fighters’ and terrorists. But
America was not interested in such distinctions.
For more than half a century, the Kashmir cause had been almost
the raison d’être for Pakistan’s existence – not to mention for the role
of the armed forces in the politics of the state. 2 Musharraf’s assumption
of power had alarmed India at the time, as he was known for his
aggressive stance on Kashmir. Once in power, however, Musharraf
displayed the pragmatic tendencies which would later cause him to
disappoint fighters like Mohammed Ashfaque so bitterly. The first
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